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I. INTRODUCTION
The current wave of corporate acquisitions is not the first to occur.
Corporate acquisition activity has historically run in cycles with peaks
corresponding to periods of strong economic growth. Current acquisition
activity is said to be the fourth wave in the history of corporate
combinations.'
The first wave of corporate combinations occurred after a depression in
1893 and continued until a recession in 1904.2 This period was marked by
the formation of huge companies such as Standard Oil and U.S. Steel
1 CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1632.
2 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 192 (1985).
303
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
which were created to dominate their respective markets.3 These compa-
nies emerged and devoured smaller companies in an attempt to establish
monopolies. In response, the Roosevelt Administration began enforce-
ment of the Sherman Act 4, which had been passed in 1890 to prohibit
monopolization and restraints of trade. Further government regulation
ensued in 1914 when the Clayton Act 5 was passed. Among the specific
practices outlawed by the Clayton Act were acquisitions of a company's
competitors and interlocking directorates.
A second burst of corporate combinations began during a period of
economic growth in the 1920's.6 During that period, emerging automo-
bile companies attempted to establish vertical monopolies over all aspects
of the production process. The second wave of activity lasted until the
depression in 1930. 7
After the stock market crash in 1929, government regulation focused
on the stock market. 8 In 1934 the Securities and Exchange Commission
was established as an independent governmental agency, founded for the
express purpose of adding stability to the securities market and protect-
ing investors by requiring full disclosure of material information.
After World War II business combinations increased steadily and
culminated in the third major wave of activity during the late 1960's and
early 1970's.9 It has been said that this period was marked by the rise of
the tender offer, but most of the business combinations during this period
occurred through negotiated mergers and acquisitions. During the third
wave, the trend was toward diversification of product lines as companies
sought to combine with businesses unrelated to their major product
line.'10
3 CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1632.
4 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982). In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 211 U.S. 1 (1911), the
Sherman Act was interpreted to prohibit only unreasonable restraints of trade. Standard
Oil limited the effectiveness of the Sherman Act and prompted the enactment of the Clayton
Act to close the loopholes of the Sherman Act.
In 1950 the Clayton Act was amended to include mergers and acquisitions carried out by
asset acquisitions as well as stock sales. J. LIEGERMAN & G. SIEDEL, BusiNEss LAW AND THE
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 1019-24 (1985).
e CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1632.
7 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 192 (1985).
a CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1632.
9 Id.
1o Id. Annual takeovers during the 1960's exceed the current rate of takeover activity.
However, the current real dollar value of acquisitions and mergers is almost double the
respective activity that occurred during the 1960's. ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 193 (1985);
Hood & Benge, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Towards a Proper
Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 916 n.40 (1985). Nineteen eighty-six was a record
year for dollar-volume activity. Merger Activity Expected to Ease, not Halt, Wall St. J., Jan.
2, 1987, at 8 B, col. 3. See also infra note 17.
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In response to the heightened acquisition activity, the Williams Act"
was passed by Congress to govern tender offer activity. Through a series
of provisions, the Williams Act requires that corporations which acquire
more than five percent of the stock of another corporation file a statement
of background and intentions with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion within ten days after purchase. The Act requires that all tender
offers remain open for at least twenty days and permits shareholders who
tender their shares to withdraw them within the first fifteen days of the
offer or at any time if the shares have not been purchased within sixty
days of the tender offer. Further, the Act provides that an offeror must
purchase tendered shares on a pro rata basis, that all tendered shares
must be purchased at the same price, and that increases in the offer price
must also benefit shareholders who tendered prior to the increase. The
Williams Act was labeled a neutral regulation, but it had the effect of
reducing takeover activity for several years.
12
The current wave of takeover activity began after the recession during
the early 1970's and it has involved transactions of a magnitude unknown
in prior years. 13 Causes for the recent surge of takeover activity have been
attributed to a number of factors. Increased costs and environmental
constraints have often made the acquisition of another corporation a
cheaper and more efficient means of expansion than building. 14 Advan-
tageous income tax treatment 15 and the availability of "junk bonds" as a
means to finance acquisitions are other contributing factors. 16 The most
direct and obvious reason for increased acquisition activity, however, has
been the decline in the market value of stock to a level where the price-
earnings ratio is exceptionally low or where the decline causes the value
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f)(1982)(amending the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934).
12 CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1632.
13 S. LEE & R. COLEMAN, HANDBOOK OF MERGERS, AcQUISrrONS AND BUYOUTS 607 (1981).
During the current wave of takeover activity a pattern of increased activity has been
reflected through the world. E.g., Takeover Struggle in Canada, 20 MERGERS & AcQUISmIONs
19 (Spring 1985); Big-Deal Flavor Hits the U.K., [1985] 12 NAT'L REV. CORP. AcQUIsrIONs
(TWEED) No. 46 (Dec. 16, 1985).
14 S. LEE & R. COLEMAN, supra note 13.
"5 E.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)(Merger motivated by desire to
make use of non-refundable income tax credits).
"6 "Junk bonds" are bonds issued to finance a takeover. The label is given to these bonds
because they are high risk investments which are not investment grade. The Federal
Reserve Board began to consider the application of restrictions on "junk bonds" during the
latter months of 1985. [1985] 12 NAT'L REV. CORP. ACQUISMONS (TWEED) No. 45 (Dec. 9, 1985).
In January of 1986 the Board approved a plan which restricts "junk bond" financing of
takeovers. The plan requires that half the bond financing is backed by assets other than
target company stock. Tinkering Around with Corporate Takeovers, FORTUNE 101 (Feb. 3,
1986).
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of a company or its underlying assets to exceed aggregate market value
of outstanding stock.17
Increased takeover activity has prompted congressional hearings' 8 and
has resulted in the proposal of several bills at the federal level to reform
takeover regulations.19 The design of proposed legislation has generally
focused on the elimination or reduction of the perceived coercive effect of
"two tier, front-end loaded" tender offers.20 Legislative approaches in-
clude either a total elimination of such offers 21 or provisions which
17 Low stock prices characteristic of the current wave activity represent a sharp contrast
to third wave activity. During the third wave stock prices were much higher relative to the
price per earnings ratio and underlying asset values. The higher stock prices made many
companies impervious to takeover threats. Thus, the only practical means to acquire
companies was through negotiation.
Current stock values have created fierce competition among buyers and enabled pur-
chases to be profitable at substantial premiums over the stock market value and at higher
price per earnings multiples. See [1985] 12 NAT'L REV. CORP. ACQUISITIONS (TWEED) No. 32
(Sept. 2, 1985). See also Corporate Takeovers (Part 1) Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Serial No. 99-99) 530
(1985)[hereinafter CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PART 1) or CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PART 2)] (The
stock market's continued undervaluing of the assets of corporations caused the proliferation
of takeovers)(Statement of John J. Phelan, Jr., Chairman of the New York Stock Exchange).
18 On May 23, June 12, and October 24, 1985, hearings on corporate takeovers were held
before the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives. Tran-
scripts of testimony, witness statements, and supportive documentation amounting to
nearly fifteen hundred pages are compiled in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PART 1) & (PART 2).
19 [1985] 6 Bus. LAW. UPDATE (A.B.A.) No. 1, at 1-3 (Sept./Oct 1985). "Dozens of bills were
introduced [in 1985], calling for everything from a temporary ban on hostile takeovers to
requirements that raiders spell out the impact their deals would have on the target
companies' communities." Tinkering Around with Corporate Takeovers, FORTUNE 101 (Feb.
3,1986).
2 Two tier tender offers usually provide for a cash payment to tenderors on the first tier,
while second tier tenderors receive subordinated debt in lieu of cash. It is claimed that
stockholders are forced to sell on the first tier, even though they do not want to accept the
deal, because they may otherwise be forced to accept the less desirable second tier.
Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers: The
Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, 11
SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 293 (1984).
21 S. 860, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 131 CONG. REC. S 4011 (1985). Proposed legislation,
however, extends beyond provisions affecting the tender offer itself. For example, Ohio
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, the sponsor of S. 860 submits that the proposed legislation
would "deal with the new realities dominating the corporate tender offer arena" in the
following manner:
The legislation would prohibit front end loaded two tier offers; it would prohibit
partial tender offers where a bidder seeks more than 21 percent of the target's
stock unless he tenders for all shares at the same price or unless he has the
consent of the issuer; it would restrict greenmail; it would require tender offers to
be open for sixty business days; it would prohibit targets, once a tender offer is
announced, from making "structural changes" in the company, such as selling the
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss2/8
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provide for a voting procedure whereby a tender offer cannot be com-
pleted without the approval of the shareholders of both the bidder and
target corporation. 22
This Note will consider the merits of antitakeover legislation with
special emphasis on legislative proposals which, like second generation
state takeover statutes, would subject tender offers to the approval of
shareholders. But discussion and analysis are also applicable to federal
proposals which seek to restrict takeovers through regulatory restric-
tions rather than a shareholder vote, as well as to second generation state
takeover statutes. The view taken herein is that all antitakeover
legislation, whether at the federal or state level, is neither necessary nor
wise.
In part II, this Note will examine the proposed antitakeover legislation
which prescribes procedures for shareholder approval of tender offers. In
part III the propriety of legislation in general will be discussed. Requi-
sites to appropriate legislation will be identified as an inadequacy of
existing common law, an ability of the legislature to provide broad
resolution of the perceived problem, and the absence of negative impli-
cations as a result of a proposed enactment.
In part IV the criteria outlined in part III will be applied to proposed
antitakeover legislation. First, the adequacy of the business judgment
rule in the corporate control context will be supported. Next, the inability
of Congress to define and resolve perceived problems will be considered.
Finally, the implications attendant to antitakeover legislation will be
discussed. Specifically, consideration will be given to economic effects,
the effects on shareholders' rights, and the concurrent effect of recent
changes in the income tax code which would accompany the passage of
the proposed antitakeover legislation.
Part V will examine the constitutional validity and effectiveness of
second generation state takeover statutes. The pronounced constitutional
validity and demonstrated effectiveness of second generation state take-
over statutes revitalizes state takeover acts and obviates the need for
federal legislation.
crown jewels or issuing poison pills, without shareholder approval and; it would
close the "ten day window."
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PART 2) at 5 (Prepared Statement).
22 H.R. 1480, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 131 CONG. REC. E 857 (1985).
1987]
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II. PROPOSED ANTITAKEOVER LEGISLATION
Extensive consideration has been given to federal antitakeover legis-
lation.23 Numerous proposals designed to counter perceived problems
23 Congress, as well as the Securities and Exchange Commission, corporate executives,
so called "corporate raiders," commentators, the securities industry, and the White House
have assessed current acquisition trends in consideration of whether federal legislation
should be enacted. See, e.g., CORPORATE TAKEovERs (PART 1) & (PART 2); SEC, COMMrIrEE ON
TENDER OFFERS, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1983); Top Executives Voice Support for Moves
In Congress to Curtail Takeover Abuses, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1987, at 54, col. 5; Goodyear
Asks for Help in Preventing Takeover, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1986, at 24, col. 3; Pickens,
Chairman of Goodyear Urge Takeover Limits, Wall St. J., Apr. 2, 1987, at 6, col. 1.; 35
Concerned CEO's Launch League Against Hostile Raids', [19851 12 NAT'L REV. CORP.
AcQUISITIONS (TwEED) No. 36 (Sept. 30, 1985); Corp. Fin. Week, Aug. 19, 1985, at 3; Note,
Tender Offer Defenses: The Need for National Guidelines in Light of Mobil, 21 SAN DIEco L.
REv. 1151 (1984). Latest Insider Arrest Bring Urgency to Push for Overhaul, Wall St. J.,
Feb. 13, 1987, at 12, col. 5 ("both lawmakers and stock-market professionals said
yesterday's arrests send a clear signal: An overhaul of takeover and securities practices has
become increasingly likely."); Taking a Look at Takeovers, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 20, 1986,
§ 3, at 1, col. 1 ("Reagan administration is taking another look at corporate takeover
legislation in the wake of the Ivan Boesky [insider trading] case.").
Perceiving that new legislation is inevitable and possibly far-reaching, the Securities
Industry Association has proposed recommendations for tender offer activity. Among the
recommendations are prohibitions on greenmail payments, poison pill provisions, acquisi-
tions of target stock beyond the five percent required reporting threshold (i.e., completely
shut the ten-day window), and the extension of the mandatory minimum offering period for
tender offers from the current twenty business days to thirty calendar days. Securities
Industry Association Urges Congress to Tighten Takeover Regulation, Wall St. J., Mar. 26,
1987, at 62, col. 1.
Heretofore antitakeover legislation has been enacted only at the state level. Prior to
1982 states had extensively enacted statutes designed to enable target corporations to
resist contested tender offers. Trevor & Edwards, State Regulation of Corporate Takeovers:
Developments Since Edgar v. Mite Crop., 43 J. Buvotrrs & AcQUISMONS 1, 2 (1985). See also
Will 'Poison Pill' Lose Its Taste?, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 3, col. 1. The general thrust
of state statutes was to invoke administrative hearings to review and determine the
substantive fairness of an offer. Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes
Violate the Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3, 5 (1985). Tender offers were temporarily
halted during the review period and permanently halted if required disclosures or if the
offer were deemed substantively unfair. State statutes applied to all tender offers, thus,
their effect impacted on interstate commerce.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), an Illinois antitakeover statute was
overturned on commerce clause grounds. Since MITE state statutes have changed their
focus from regulation of securities offerings to the regulation of the internal affairs of
corporations organized under state law. Sargent, supra. Post-MITE or second generation
state antitakeover statutes generally regulate changes in corporate control under the
states' traditional power to regulate the internal affairs of corporations. MITE, 457 U.S. at
638. In Cardiff Acquisitions, Inc. v. Hatch, 751 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1984), a Minnesota
statute of this nature, that did not assert power to suspend offers outside Minnesota was
upheld.
Federal legislation has been proposed because constitutional limitations on state regu-
[Vol. 35:303
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attributed to increased acquisition activity have been presented to
Congress.
In 1983 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Advisory
Committee issued a report on tender offers.24 The report made fifty
recommendations which were studied by the SEC. As a result of SEC
studies a legislative proposal was made which would have restricted both
offensive and defensive takeover tactics.
Offensive restrictions would have narrowed the ten-day filing window
for reports disclosing purchases of more than five percent of a company's
stock and allowed the SEC to stay additional stock purchases for up to
two days. In addition, defensive restrictions would have prevented a
target company from acquiring its own stock via self-tender; 25 issuing
securities or stock rights during a tender offer period when share-
holders would thereby acquire more than five percent of the out-
standing shares;26 and modifying executive or director compensation 27
lations place the bulk of all takeovers beyond the reach of existing, direct regulation.
Treavor & Edwards, supra, at 5.
The constitutionality of second generation state takeover statutes was upheld in Dynam-
ics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). The validity of broad enabling
provisions now provide a potent means for self help takeover defenses. See infra notes
200-16 and accompanying text.
24 SEC, COMMrITEE ON TENDER OFFERS, supra note 23.
25 SEC, COMMITrEE ON TENDER OFFERS, supra note 23, at 21-23.
21 Stock rights plans contingent upon a change of control are commonly called "poison
pills". Poison pills are a defensive tactic designed to bar all tender offers by providing
stockholders with the right to purchase stock at bargain prices in the event of a takeover not
receiving the approval of the board of directors. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d
1059 (Del. Ch. 1985), af'd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
A poison pill stock rights plan may also have the effect of restricting an effort to conduct
a proxy contest to replace the board of directors. Middleton, Takeover Tactics Tested in
Delaware, Nat'l L.J., June 3, 1985, at 28 (Argument of plaintiff counsel in Moran).
The effect of a poison pill stock rights plan on the market price of stock is the subject of
much debate. Compare Turning A Profit From Takeover Attempts, Wall St. J., June 4, 1986,
at 26, col. 3 ('The poison pill is likely to generate increased returns to the target's
shareholders.") with CORPoRATE TAKEOVERS (PART 2) at 23 ("Poison pills have a negative
impact on the market price of the issuer's shares.")(Statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission). Moreover, it is questionable that the precise
impact of poison pills or other tactics employed in the takeover context is determinable. See
Will 'Poison Pill' Lose Its Taste, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 10, 1986, at 3, col. 1. But see Brief for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Amicus Curiae at 28, Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985)(even the weakest defensive tactics have a "significant effect" and
they deter tender offers by at least 26%).
27 Many corporations have employed preventive devices, commonly referred to as "shark
repellants," to forestall tender offers.
These preventative devices, which take the form of charter provisions, bylaws,
or binding agreements between management and the target corporation, are
designed to discourage an aggressor from making a tender offer in the first place.
One technique that sometimes is characterized as shark repellant is the "golden
parachute" agreement. Such an agreement, made between key management
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
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during the pendency of a tender offer. Other provisions of the SEC
proposal would have prohibited a target company from purchasing its
own stock from anyone holding more than three percent of a class of
securities for less than two years.28 The SEC has not supported a
subsequent legislative proposal. 29
employees and the employer corporation, provides for lucrative severance pay
upon a change of managerial control resulting from a takeover by an aggressor
corporation. Classification of a golden parachute agreement as a shark repellant
is presumed on the theory that it discourages takeover attempts because it visits
a substantial financial cost on the target corporation, which ultimately must be
absorbed either by the aggressor corporation or by the shareholders of the target
corporation.
Hood & Benge, Golden Parachute Agreements: Reasonable Compensation or Disguised
Bribery?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 199, 200-01 (1985).
2 The draft bill was designed to attack payment of "greenmail". Greenmail is an issuer
corporation's purchase of its own stock at a premium price in order to induce a raider to drop
a takeover attempt. CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1634. Hence, settlements are structured
such that payments to the would-be raider fall outside what has been defined as
"greenmail." After dropping his takeover bid for Goodyear, Sir James Goldsmith remarked:
"The fact that I'm receiving 50 cents less than the $50 being offered shareholders is
symbolically very important to me." Nimble Financier, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col.
6. But in addition to the buyback price Goldsmith received expenses-about thirty seven
million dollars. Plus, he received cash for his shares while Goodyear's other shareholders
were relegated to awaiting the prospects of Goodyear's restructuring efforts. rd.; Goodyear
Could Be More Efficient Firm As It Focuses on Tires and Cuts Costs, Wall St. J., Nov. 24,
1986, at 4, col. 2.
25 SEC Won't Review Proposals on Tender Offers, Washington Post, Apr. 5, 1985, at 1,
col. 4. The SEC supports the closing of the ten-day filing window, but it has opposed
extending the tender offer period from twenty to sixty days; requiring purchasers of twenty
percent of a corporation's stock to make an offer for all of its stock; and restrictions on
takeover defensive tactics. SEC Opposes Takeover Curbs, [1984] CORP. AcQUInSMONS, MERG-
ERS, AND DrvEsTrruRs (P-H) 8 (Nov. 1984).
The SEC has exercised its rulemaking ability to cure perceived tender offer abuses. In
July 1985, the SEC proposed new rules which would require that tender offers be extended
to all security holders of a class of securities subject to a tender offer ("all-holders rule") and
that all security holders of the class be paid the highest consideration offered to any security
holder ("best-price provision"). Additionally, the proposals would have required that a
tender offer remain open for ten business days after an increase in the amount of securities
sought through a tender offer. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-22198, 50 Fed. Reg. 27976 (July 9, 1985)(regarding proposed Rule 14d-10);
Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 34-22199,50 Fed. Reg. 28210 (July 11,
1985)(regarding proposed amendments to Rule 13e-4).
The SEC re-proposed an amendment to Rule 13e-4 and a new Rule 14d-10 which required
that a tender offer remain open for a minimum period of ten business days after a decrease
or an increase either in the consideration offered or the percentage of shares sought in the
offer. The "best-price provision" was also revised to apply to the highest price paid rather
than the highest price offered. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-22791, 51 Fed. Reg. 3186 (Jan. 24, 1986)(supplanting, in part, proposals
made in Exchange Act Release No. 34-22198, supra).
In Amendments to Tender Offer Rules; All Holders and Best Price, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-23421, 51 Fed. Reg. 25873 (July 17, 1986), the SEC announced the adoption of the
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol35/iss2/8
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Proposed legislation currently before Congress reflects, in varying
degrees, the recommendations of the SEC Advisory Committee. The least
"all-holders requirement," as revised, in new Rule 14d-10 (applying the "all-holders
requirement" and "best-price provisions" to bidders). Revised amendments to Rule 13d
were also adopted. As amended, Rules 13e-4(f)(8)-(f)(10)(ii)(applying the "all-holders re-
quirement" and "best price provision" to an issuer or affiliate), parallel new Rule
14d-10(a)-(d)(2).
Amended Rules 13e-4(fl)(ii) and 14e-l(b) extend the mandatory minimum offering
period whenever there are changes in the consideration offered or the percentage or amount
of securities sought. Rules 13e-4(f)(2) and 14d-7 extend a tendering shareholder's right to
withdraw tendered shares until the expiration of the offering period.
The SEC adoption of the "all-holders requirement" was apparently precipitated by the
fact that defensive tactics employed by the Unocal Corporation were sustained, in part, due
to the Commission's failure to adopt its previously proposed rules. Unocal responded to a
tender offer with a selective self-tender, a tender offer to all shareholders except the
original tender offeror. SEC Bans Biased Tender Offers, Nat'l L.J., July 28, 1986, at 3.
The court in Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (D. Cal. 1985), speculated
that the SEC's failure to adopt the proposed rules was based on either a lack of rule-making
authority or a SEC policy that did not require that tender offers be open to all shareholders.
The SEC's ultimate adoption of the "all-holders" rule lacks authority in the context of a self
tender offer by an issuer.
In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472, U.S. 1 (1985), the Supreme Court held that
the Williams Act is solely a disclosure statute which limits the SEC's authority to insuring
compliance with disclosure requirements. Opponents of the SEC-adopted rules argue that,
on the basis of Schreiber, the SEC lacks authority to adopt the rules. SEC Bans Biased
Tender Offers, supra at 18.
The SEC contends that its authority for the "all-holders requirement" lies within the
broad enabling provisions of the Exchange Act of 1934. The validity of the rules is based
on the proposition that "Lso long as the rule promulgated pursuant to such general
rulemaking authority is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation it
will be sustained."' Exchange Act Release No. 34-23421, supra at 25875 n.16 (quoting
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)). A reasonable
relation to a statutory purpose is premised upon the contention that "nontendering
shareholders are within the class for whose protection the Williams Act was designed." Id.
at 25878 n.28 (quoting Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1368 (D.
Tex. 1979)).
Exchange Act Release No. 34-23421 disingenuously fails to refer to Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)(selective self-tender upheld as a valid exercise of
business judgment), or Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081, 1082 (D. Cal. 1985)(court
notes that the SEC proposed, but failed to adopt similar tender offer rules in 1977 and 1979).
The rules adopted by the SEC were proposed soon after and they were doubtless prompted
by the Unocal cases.
More notably, the SEC fails to address and consider the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), on the rules it adopted. Piper
held that parties which are regulated by the Williams Act do not fall within the class
intended to be protected by the Act. Specifically, a tender offeror is not within the class
protected by the Williams Act.
SEC authority for the rules is predicated on the "nontendering shareholder" being with-
in the class protected by the Williams Act. But where, as in both Unocal cases, a target
company responds to a tender offer with a self-tender offer which excludes the initial
tender offeror, pursuant to Piper will not fall within the class protected by the Williams
Act. The SEC's "all-holders" rule, therefore, is wholly without authority with respect to a
selective self-tender offer made in response to a tender offer. Thus, the "all-holders" rule
1987]
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restrictive of several bills proposed by Congress in 1985 was the Share-
holder Democracy Act of 1985.30 The Shareholder Democracy Act pro-
posed amendments to Sections 13 and 14 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. The Act would implement a two-step shareholder approval
process which would essentially put acquisitions on the same basis as
mergers by requiring approval of both bidder and issuer shareholders. 31
The effect of the Act is to make it unlawful to take delivery of or pay for
securities tendered without the approval of a majority of voting shares,
plus a majority of all voting shares after exclusion of shares held by the
bidder and the target companies. 32 A quorum for a special shareholders'
meeting to vote on a tender offer would consist of a simple majority of
shareholders.
The Shareholder Democracy Act further prescribes that a tender offer
remain open for at least sixty business days rather than for the currently
applicable offering period of twenty days. A person planning to acquire
shares via tender offer would also be required to report his future
intentions and submit a statement concerning the impact of the tender
offer on the community. A potential acquirer must specifically state
whether he would mortgage or otherwise encumber significant assets of
the bidder or target company; make changes that would significantly
affect the communities in which either corporation has operations;
make significant changes affecting management, organized labor, or
employees; make changes in the business or corporate structure; affect a
merger; or make any changes that would affect the production of goods or
performance of services for any governmental agency.
More restrictive legislative proposals include the Corporate Productiv-
ity Act of 198533 and the Shareholder Fairness Act of 1985.34 The
Corporate Productivity Act of 1985 would prohibit acquisition of fifteen
percent or more of a company's voting shares unless a majority of the
target company's independent directors or two-thirds of its voting stock-
holders approve the bidder's tender offer. 35 The Act would require that all
is not valid in the context of the responsive, selective self-tender offer which prompted its
adoption.
For another analysis of SEC tender offer rulemaking, see Significant 1986 Regulatory
and Legislative Developments, 42 Bus. LAW. 827, 840-45 (1987).
30 H.R. 1480, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 131 CONG. REc. E 857 (1985).
" The proposed voting process represents an unprecedented expansion of shareholder
voting rights. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
82 State incorporation laws could increase, but not decrease the required approval
margin.
" S. 706, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 131 CONG. Rac. S 3243 (1985).
34 S. 860, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 131 CONG. REC. S 4011 (1985).
" The Corporate Productivity Act of 1985 is more restrictive than the Shareholder
Democracy Act of 1985 because it requires approval of two-thirds, rather than a simple
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acquisitions exceeding fifteen percent of a target company may only occur
via a tender offer and subject to approval requirements. Potential
acquirers would be required to disclose to the target company's share-
holders their plans for the target company, including any changes in the
location of its principal executive office; material business activities;
customer or supplier relationships; employment policies; or existing
management.
The Shareholder Fairness Act of 1985 would completely prohibit
two-tier, front-end loaded tender offers. Additionally the Act would
restrict greenmail payments;36 prohibit defensive tactics after announce-
ment of a tender offer; extend the tender offer period to sixty days; and
narrow the current ten-day filing window to two days.
Despite the amount of discussion, criticism, and investigation given to
federal antitakeover legislation no consensus as to the best course of
action has emerged.
37
During 1985, takeovers were a hot topic of national interest. Delays in
the introduction of legislation "allowed a once feverish interest in
curbing takeovers to subside," and support for legislation dwindled. 38
Legislative initiative remained in abeyance, and no major legislation was
enacted in 1986.39 Legislative impetus has, once again, become vigorous
majority, of voting shareholders unless an offer is approved by a majority of directors at the
outset. The different degree of restrictiveness may be attributable to the fact that the
Shareholder Democracy Act of 1985 was designed specifically to work in conjunction with,
rather than instead of state takeover statutes.
" The greenmail provisions of the Shareholder Fairness Act of 1985 parallel the
legislation that the SEC proposed in 1983. See supra text accompanying note 28; Trevor,
Edwards & Moellenberg, Proposed Federal Tender Offer Reform Legislation: The Share-
holder Democracy Act of 1985, 56 CLEVELAND B.J. 282, 284 (1985).
" Compare CORPoRATn TAKEOVERS (PAlr 1) at 191 ("takeovers are, in aggregate, benefi-
cial to the economy.")(prepared statement on behalf of the Office of Management and
Budget) with id. at 696 ("The present environment which abounds in hostile bids ... [is]
clearly negative for our national welfare.")(prepared statement on behalf of the American
Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc.). See also id at 619 ("there is no broad consensus as to
what the problem is.")(exhibit submitted by the American Stock Exchange); id. at
710-12(realizing takeover efforts have both positive and negative results and suggesting a
cautious approach)(prepared statement on behalf of the National Conference on Public
Employee Retirement Systems).
38 D'Amato Accused on Anti-Takeover Bill, New York Times, Nov. 25, 1986 § 12, at 6.
39 E.g., Merger Activity Expected to Ease Not Halt, Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1987, at 8B,
col. 3.
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because of insider trading,40 controversial takeover attempts, and target
buybacks. 41
In early 1987, federal legislative proposals again focused on takeovers.
Renewed interest in takeover legislation has adopted a different ap-
proach and emphasis. Proposals have spurned the "shareholder democ-
racy" notion and its attendant shareholder approval of tender offers.
Instead, the emphasis of the more recent legislation is to regulate the
tactics viewed as abusive or unfair. Current legislative proposals strive to
balance the rights of bidders and target corporations through the impo-
sition of additional onerous procedural and disclosure rules which have
long been the touchstone of tender offer regulation.42
The Tender Offer Reform Act of 198743 includes procedural changes
which would extend the minimum tender offer period to require an offer
to remain open for sixty days, shorten the ten day window for open
market purchases to twenty-four hours, and require that acquisitions in
excess of ten percent of a corporation's stock occur via a tender offer.
'0 E.g., Latest Insider Arrests Brings Urgency to Push for Overhaul, Wall St. J., Feb. 13,
1987, at 12, col. 5; Wall Street May Face Big Changes in the Wake of Boesky Scandal, Wall
St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 1, col. 6. The SEC Chairman, however, does not believe that
legislation should be predicated on a surge of insider trading. Latest Insider Arrests Bring
Urging to Push for Overhaul, Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 12, col. 6 ("the insider trading
scandal shouldn't be the impetus for takeover legislation, since insider trading is parasitical
activity, not the 'driving force' behind takeovers."). Accord Market Madness: No Easy
Answers, Nat'l L. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 32 (comments of Stephen Fraidin).
The Tender Offer Disclosure and Fairness Act of 1987, S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1,
133 CONG. REC. S 7594 (1987), is a legislative package which is directed at both insider
trading and takeovers. Takeover related provisions would close the ten-day window for
reporting holdings to the SEC. The Act would require reporting within one day while also
reducing the reporting threshold from five percent to three percent. The twenty day
minimum tender offer period would be extended to thirty five days and a formal tender offer
would be mandated upon the acquisition of fifteen percent of a corporation's stock.
Disclosure requirements would require identification of financing sources and fees.
Additionally, a formal statement of whether the acquisition is for investment or takeover
purposes would be required. Acquirers for investment purposes would be precluded from
making a tender offer for six moths.
Additional provisions prohibit greenmail or stock buybacks at a premium, self-executing
"poison pill" provisions, and restrict the use of pension funds to pay takeover debts. See also
Senate Bill Seeks Stiffer Penalties For Insider Cases, Wall St. J., June 5, 1987, at 4, col. 2.
41 Nimble Financier, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 6 (Ohio enacts special
legislation to block the takeover of Goodyear); Goodrich Buyback of Icahn's Stake Criticized
by Judge, Wall St. J., Jan. 16, 1987, at 6, col. 2 (judge finds ample evidence to support a
claim of corporate waste in Samuel M. Feinberg Testamentary Trust v. Carter, 652 F.
Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
42 What the SEC Needs, Wall St. J., May 28, 1987, at 26, col. 1; CONG. Q., May 2, 1987,
at 835.
43 H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 133 CoNG. REC. H 2540 (1987). For a similar bill
proposed in 1987, see supra note 40. See also The Corporate Takeover and Insider Abuse Act,
S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1, 133 CONG. REC. S 7666 (1987).
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Additionally, open market purchases of target corporation stock would be
suspended for thirty days following the withdrawal of a tender offer.
44
New prohibitions in the Act prevent greenmail payments and golden
parachute provisions. SEC rulemaking authority would be extended, and
the Act would require the issuance of rules to restrict the use of defensive
tactics in response to a takeover bid. Shareholder approval for the defense
tactic would also be required.4
5
Required disclosures include a bidder's statement describing tender
offer terms and the inclusion in the management proxy statement of
the director nominees of certain significant shareholders. The Act also
requires an affirmative response to inquiries relating to takeover rumors.
Apparently convinced that more regulation must be the answer,
Congress continues to draft takeover legislation. Proper recognition has
not been afforded to the possibility that targeted abuses are the product
of an ill-advised regulatory scheme emanating from the adoption of the
Williams Act. Reform may be essential, but current legislative proposals
may be further cause, rather than the cure, for targeted abuses. Congress
should consider the original error in its ways and act to repeal the
Williams Act rather than to extend its reach.
46
III. THE PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION GENERALLY
Prerequisites to the propriety of any particular legislation are a
common law deficiency, 47 a superior decision-making ability of the
legislature over the ability of courts, and the absence of negative
implications that may thwart the democratic will of the people. 48 All
three prerequisites are necessary before legislation is appropriate. Ab-
sent these prerequisites the prevailing common law scheme is preferable,
despite any imperfections.
41 Open market purchases were an effective takeover method for Hanson Trust PLC.
Dingell-Markey Bill Would Bar Raiders From Fast Open-Market Moves on Firms, Wall St.
J., Apr. 27, 1987, at 2, col. 3.
4' The Act may cause the constitutionality of second generation state takeover statutes
to once again become an issue. At present, the Act does not address the issue of pre-emption,
but the issue is to be resolved as the bill moves forward. CONG. Q., May 2, 1987, at 836.
Without question, the self-executing provisions Of OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.16
(Anderson Supp. 1986), would be pre-empted by the Act's provisions which expressly
require shareholder approval of defensive tactics. See also infra note 216.
" Henry Manne suggests that the repeal of the Williams Act is essential to promote a
desirable takeover policy and to resolve insider trading by removing poorly designed
regulations. The Real Boesky-Case Issue, New York Times, Nov. 25, 1986, at A-27, col. 1.
47 Where a void is adequately filled by common law doctrines or where legislation is
otherwise not necessary the common law scheme is sufficient.
'8 See generally G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982); H. HART &
A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (1958)(discussion of law-making).
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A. Deficiency at Common Law
The principal instrument of the American legal system has been
common law.49 The American legal system might be conceived of as
existing without statutes, but not without common law. 50 The genius of
the common law system is its capacity for orderly growth.5' Legislative
intervention is appropriate when there is a need for laws either more
structured or more immediate than courts can afford.52 Before legislation
is appropriate, however, it should be clear beyond debate that judicial
solutions are unsatisfactory and that they will not be changed by the
judiciary. 53
A deficiency of common law is an important prerequisite for legislation
because long range implications accompany statutory interventions.
54
Accordingly, prior to any legislative enactment, there should be a
manifest need for an instant resolution and no alternative except the
enactment.
B. Comparative Abilities of Legislatures and Courts
Legislatures inherently have a superior ability over courts to gather
and consider facts. In contrast, courts are not well situated to make
certain decisions because they do not have the data to know what should
be done, nor do courts have the ability to obtain such information.
55
Additionally, issues which legislative consideration would reveal
would not be at stake and thus not made apparent in a singular
adversarial court setting.56 Legislatures are in a position to gather and
consider facts while not confronted with one specific issue that demands
instant resolution. The broad scope of legislative inquiry, in contrast with
narrow judicial inquiry ,57 is more conducive to providing resolution once
and for all. Since legislatures establish predetermined results before
disputes occur, justified expectations which could be cut off by retroactive
4 G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 4.
0 E. FRUEND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 34 (1965).
5' Lum v. Fullaway, 42 Hawaii 500, 502-03 (1958).
52 G. CALABRESi, supra note 48, at 5. However, the perception of need for legislation
rather than the actual, existing current need for legislation may be predominant. Id. at 45
(during the New Deal era legislation was generally deemed appropriate.)
a H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 48, at 726.
, See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
s G. CAIABSSl, supra note 48, at 146. As a practical matter the superior decision
making ability of legislatures may represent only a potential for better decision efficacy.
Cohen, Hearings on a Bill - Legislative Folklore?, 37 MINN. L. REv. 34, 38 n.5 (1952)("Con-
gress utilize[s] data reported by staff only to bolster a preconceived notion or position
dictated by party commitments.").
5' G. CALABRESi, supra note 48, at 146.
57 Judicial inquiry is limited to the issues raised by the facts of a particular case while
legislative inquiry addresses all possible issues in a defined context.
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judicial action may not be defeated by legislation which provides advance
warning of its imminence. 58
Legislatures, however, should impose exacting standards on them-
selves to insure that their decision-making ability in a given situation is
not only superior to that of a court, but that there are adequate
assurances of reliability in absolute terms.59 Legislation should be
justified by its absolute effectiveness and broad applicability, rather than
by the inane fact that it is the product of extensive investigation and
deliberation. Prior to enactment, legislation should be justified on the
basis that it is a sensible, measured approach which will successfully
resolve the issues addressed; it should not be justified on the grounds that
it will merely offer to provide better redress than current judicial
doctrines.
Drafters of legislation should seek a general solution capable of broad
resolution in all future situations.6 0 The mere applicability of an eqact-
ment to all future situations is, however, not sufficient justification;
concerns of justice and equity must also be served. An inability to design
a statute to achieve these concerns, while contemporaneously affording
broad resolution of the issues addressed should be an indication that a
legislature should not act. Narrow, ad hoc judicial decisions may be more
capable of flexibility and adaptation to contrasting factual situations and,
therefore, more desirable than legislation. Where concerns of justice and
equity cannot be readily accommodated, legislative action may result in
a statute that is either too general and easily circumvented or too
restrictive and binding on the future because of detailed rules.61
C. Absence of Negative Implications
Particular needs for immediate resolution, coupled with the gradual
progression of the law, can create the perception that legislative lawmak-
ing is appropriate even where common law might have been capable of
58 G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 146. Legislative law operates prospectively, applying
only to those cases which arise after its enactment. Conversely, judicial law-making
functions retrospectively-affecting acts, duties, and rights occurring or existing before the
law came into force.
" Legislatures could adopt self-limiting doctrines whereby no action is taken on an
issue when the legislature's ability to provide resolution is only theoretically, but not
actually, superior to the ability of courts to decide. Legislative enactments could then be
limited to situations where legislatures possess an absolute ability to resolve the situation
addressed. Cf G. CmABRsL, supra note 48, at 45 (During the New Deal neither courts nor
legislatures were capable of obtaining facts and developing standards capable of providing
resolution of agreed problems.).
6o H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 38, at 800.
61 G. CALAsREsx, supra note 48, at 167-68 (Non-categorical statutory language allows
courts to go beyond the limits of a statute to decide a pressing case.); H. HART & A. SACKS,
supra note 48, at 802 (Legislation subjects law in that field, for the indefinite future, to rigid
techniques of development or non-development.).
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adequately resolving matters.62 The momentary dominance of a crisis can
compel legislative actions bearing everlasting adverse effects.63 Politi-
cians have only imperfect knowledge of the present and future prefer-
ences of constituents.64 Similarly, the long-range implications of legisla-
tion are not always envisioned. It is, therefore, inevitable that
legislatures will perpetuate, rather than correct, common law defects or
deficiencies. 65
Although legislation may be considered preferable to conditions pre-
vailing in its absence, it may seriously harm the economy. Government
regulations can encourage inefficiency, contribute to inflation, and serve
as a vehicle to protect special interests rather than the public interest.66
Legislators must consider all side effects incident to a particular enact-
ment. Resolution of one situation may cause greater, irreparable harm
elsewhere.67 The propriety of legislation is dependent upon whether full
62 G. CALABREsi, supra note 48, at 5.
6' The New Deal created adverse effects that last today: A trend toward precise rule
delineation rather than compilations of common law. G. CALABRESIt, supra note 48, at 5; G.
GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 96 (1977)("Unfortunately, with the New Deal, a style
of drafting which aimed at unearthly and superhuman precision came into vogue... "). The
proliferation of inefficient programs and agencies also resulted from the New Deal. G.
CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 44-58; B. SIEGAN, REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 88, 70
(1979):
For a bureaucrat the first law is to keep on doing what you are doing, whether
it is necessary or not. The second law is to do more of what you are doing, whether
it is necessary or not. The third law is to do something else in addition to what you
are doing, whether it is necessary or not. The fourth law is that whatever you are
doing, you must do it inflexibly. [The fifth law is that iln bureaucratic action costs
do not matter or are subsidiary, except where they are costs to the government or
to the regulatory body itself.
64 S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, CoRRUPTION, A STUDY IN PoLITIcAL ECONOMY 20 (1978).
65 E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 72 (1965). See also International-Debt
Experts Worry That Congress Will Tinker With Problems and Make It Worse, Wall St. J.,
Mar. 12, 1987, at 62, col. 1 ("Congress is more likely to harm than help the situation.").
66 B. SIEGAN, THE INTERACTION OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 171 (1977); Consumer Groups
Draw Fire for Ignoring Regulation's Cost, INSIGHT 44 (Feb. 16, 1987).
7 See supra note 63. The presence and effect of other legislation affecting the area
addressed by proposed legislation should be considered before additional actions are taken.
H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 48, at 721. Legislators must be sure that other pending or
recently passed enactments will not adversely impact the area of concern. If other measures
have recently or will soon affect the area considered by legislators, subsequent legislation
should not follow until the effect of prior legislation can be assessed.
Should the prior enactment fail to be completely satisfactory, legislators can learn from
the mistakes made and, more importantly, avoid compounding mistakes. Alternatively, if
the prior enactment is completely or partially successful, legislators will have better
insights into the type of revisions which would be advantageous. Again, there would be a
minimization of mistakes and a potential for a resolution with a minimum of restrictions
invoked.
For a discussion of the potential effects of concurrent changes in the tax code and
antitakeover legislation, see infra notes 174-199.
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consideration is given to the long-range implications which may follow;
therefore, legislatures should seek and find assurances both of the
desirability of an enactment's result and of its long-range implications.6S
Legislation which overtly thwarts the democratic will of the people is
unlikely due to the obvious political ramifications. More subtle thwart-
ing, however, often occurs. Legislation commonly bears conclusory,
fallacious titles which purport to make the enactments seem above
reproach. 69 In this type of legislation legislators presuppose agreement
where no consensus is apparent; in essence, legislators act without regard
to public needs and desires.
The effects of most legislation are not immediately apparent. It takes
time for the impact of legislation to be realized and for a consensus of
opinion relative to that impact to be formed. Generally, new laws
represent or only run obliquely counter to the prevailing majority view.
Few serious problems exist initially, but later changed circumstances
render laws inconsistent as they no longer serve current needs or
represent the thinking of current majorities.70 Problems incident to
legislation which is, or becomes, inconsistent with the social or legal
environment should induce legislators to exercise restraint. Statutes
passed during times of crisis or in an experimental spirit should be
carefully considered and drafted narrowly if action is deemed necessary. 71
When laws are no longer functional, they may fail to comport with
societal changes.7 2 The result of statutory law-making is that laws are
currently governing us that would not and could not be passed today.
Continuity and change will always be essential to an effective, efficient
legal system.73 While the law must change to meet the changing needs of
society, abrupt or frequent changes are not desirable. Legislation should
be written narrowly and applied sparingly. Legislatures should be
" Cf. G. GIMoRE, supra note 63, at 95 ("One of the facts of legislative life ... is that
getting a statute enacted in the first place is much easier than getting the statute reviewed
so that it will make sense in the light of changed conditions."); H. HART & A. SACKS, supra
note 48, at 721 (Few controversial acts of Congress are repealed; their staying power is
greater than Constitutional doctrines of the Supreme Court); 5 THE WmTINGS OF THOMAS
JEFnsON 121 (Paul L. Ford ed. 1895)("No society can make a perpetual constitution, or
even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation.").
63 Legislation often bears a title prefaced with "fair" or includes "equity" or other
similarly conclusive language as if to place an enactment above reproach. Equity, fairness,
and similar concepts are abstract notions legislators treat loosely and employ frequently.
See, e.g., U.S. Fair Trade Laws Are Anything But, Wall St. J., June 3, 1987, at 26, col. 4.
70 G. CALABRESI, supra note 48, at 6; supra note 68.
71 Care should be taken to avoid the inherent possibility of adverse effects of legislation.
See supra note 63.
72 Courts are unable to keep laws functional in the presence of a statute. General respect
for statutes precludes courts from overriding or acting interstitially. G. CALPEeSl, supra
note 38, at 6-7.
73 id.
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cautious not to be overly responsive as they may indefinitely impose the
will of temporary or non-existent majorities.
After careful consideration and upon reaching a conclusion that there
is a deficiency at common law, legislatures should then only act when
they are in a position to afford broad resolution of a problem without
thwarting the democratic will of the people-either currently or prospec-
tively. Legislation of the utmost propriety is guided by the credo:
Legislation is needed, not to repress the forces through which
judge-made law develops, but to stimulate and free them .... The
judicial process is to be set in motion again, but with a new point
of departure, a new impetus and direction. In breaking one set of
shackles, we are not to substitute another.
74
IV. THE PROPRIETY OF ANTITAKEOVER LEGISLATION
A. The Adequacy and Applicability of Common Law:
The Business Judgment Rule
Judicial inquiry into the decisions made by a corporation's board of
directors is governed by the business judgment rule.75 The business
judgment rule has been formulated in myriad ways by courts and
commentators. 76 Formulations of the business judgment rule generally
include a factual presumption that directors in good faith exercised their
best business judgment.77 On the basis of the presumption, a decision by
directors will not be overturned by courts unless the basis for the
presumption is successfully rebutted.
The deference given to business judgments is the result of several
policy justifications designed to encourage economic development. 78 The
rule provides encouragement for the most competent people to serve as
directors by eliminating the fear of personal liability for mistakes.
Human fallability transcends all aspects of life-including corporate
7 Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARv. L. REV. 113, 117 (1921).
7 See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSRA L. REV. 93
(1980).
76 E.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984); Pantor v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Arsht, supra
note 75, at 112; Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 621 (1983).
" Arsht, supra note 75, at 112.
78 Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits: Has Unchecked Discretion
Gone Too Far?, 53 UMKC L. REV. 257, 258 (1985).
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decisions. Courts, therefore, adopted a standard of review that would
encourage qualified people to assume positions of authority.79
Further justification for the business judgment rule stems from its
ability to allow room for the discretion necessary in the development of
policies and decision-making.80 Wide latitude is afforded to directors to
promote efficient and effective corporate operations. A recent justification
for the business judgment rule lies in the nature of the decision under
review. Courts are not well suited to assess complex corporate matters
and courts cannot operate the nation's businesses.8' The inability of
courts to deal with the subject matter at issue in business decisions is
further compounded by current overcrowding in the courts.8 2
The interrelationship and cumulative effect of policy justifications has
resulted in a powerful common law rule. Judicial inquiry is not, however,
completely precluded by the business judgment rule because prerequisite
conditions limit its application. The business judgment rule presumption
will only apply in the absence of a breach of the duty of care in the process
of making the decision under review.
Before courts invoke the business judgment rule and its attendant
presumption, consideration is given to the facts and circumstances sur-
rounding a business decision in order to assess the extent to which
directors complied with their duty of care.83
The elements which generally comprise the duty of care are a conscious
exercise of judgment; an informed decision; good faith and disinterested
decision-making; and a rational basis for the decision.8 Discharge of the
duty of care is contingent upon compliance with the legal standard of care
with respect to each element of the duty of care.
Generally, the legal standard by which the duty of care is measured is
one of reasonableness.8 5 During the performance of functions, directors
71 Note, supra note 76, at 651.
" Zapata Corp. v. Mandonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981)(The business judgment
rule exists to promote the free exercise of managerial power). See also Note, supra note 76,
at 651; Note, supra note 78, at 258 (same).
81 Note, supra note 76, at 651. Cf. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 1010-12 (1981)(The
business judgment rule functions primarily as a "statement of judicial restraint.").
82 Note, supra note 78, at 259.
f" Note, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests for Corporate
Control, 76 Nw. U.L. RPv. 980, 984 (1984).
14 A.L.I., PINCwLES OF COPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 56, 59, 61,
62 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984).
" Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944)(There is no conflict between the
business judgment rule and negligence); Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891)(Directors
are bound to use the amount of care that a careful and prudent man would use under similar
circumstances). However, there is some dispute as to the application of the standard.
Compare Veasey & Manning, Codified Standard: Safe Harbor or Unchartered Reef? An
Analysis of the Model Act Standard of Care Compared With Delaware Law, 35 Bus. LAW. 919
19871
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should exhibit the care of an "ordinarily prudent person would reason-
ably be expected to exercise in a like position and under similar
circumstances."8 6 The standard of care is flexible and accommodates the
special skills or expertise of directors as well as the factual setting in
which an alleged dereliction of duty arose. 7
Initial judicial inquiry should not consider the merits of a business
decision. If, on the other hand, directors fail to discharge their duty of
care,88 the business judgment rule is no longer applicable and any
resulting business decision will be fully reviewed.
(1980)("reasonably" as used in the MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT invites judicial scrutiny
of business decisions) with Arsht & Hinsey, Codified Standard-Same Harbor But Char-
tered Channel: A Response, 35 Bus. LAW 947 (1980)("reasonably" is a codification of the
traditional duty of care standard).
s A.L.I., supra note 84, at 6. The trend may be towards requiring greater skill and
diligence on the part of directors. Compare Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227,229,43 N.E.2d
18, 20 (1942)(Deference given to a business judgment notwithstanding the court's recogni-
tion: "Errors may be so great that they demonstrate the unfitness of directors to manage the
corporate affairs.") with Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)(eminently
qualified directors held liable for perfunctory consideration of merger agreement). More
stringent review, however, may result from the context of the business decision. See, e.g.,
Note, supra note 83, at 987 (Circumstances surrounding decisions concerning corporate
control require a director's "utmost diligence and attention"); Manning, Reflections and
Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 5 (1985)(The
non-uniform application of the business judgment rule results because the criteria within
the rule varies with the issue at stake.).
87 A.L.I., supra note 84, at 23.
a Corporations are the creatures of the state of incorporation. Thus, the authority of
the corporation as well as the obligations imposed on the exercise of corporate authority are
fixed by state law. State corporate statutes define a limited number of required director
functions. Rather than defining the essential functions of directors, state corporation
statutes traditionally require only that a corporation is managed by a board of directors.
Thus, the corporation itself is the primary source for establishing the functions of directors.
Corporate functions may be imposed on directors by the provisions of the articles of
incorporation, by-laws, or shareholders' and board resolutions. Directors' functions are also
fixed by the conventions adopted in corporate operations. Id. at 13-14.
The standard of care is fixed by state common law or statutory provisions. States where
common law sets the standard have adopted the following formulations: "due care"; "care or
ordinary care"; "care that an ordinary prudent person would exercise under similar
circumstances"; and "care exercised by prudent person in his own affairs". State statutory
provisions have adopted or are based in the MODEL BusiNEss CORPORATION AcT § 35 (1979),
formulation which requires "care as an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances." Statutory variations from the MODEL ACT essentially add
"reasonable inquiry", delete "like position", or substitute "due care".
Certain state statutes have imposed specific duties on directors which include liability for
accepting or giving a bribe, kickback, or similar payment; denying shareholders rightful
access to books and records; consent or authorization to stock transactions prohibited by
state law; and knowingly allowing or causing a materially false report to be made. Moody,
State Statutes Governing Directors of Charitable Corporations, 18 U.S.F.L. REv. 749, 759-60
n.46 (1984)(citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SraucTuRE: RESTATEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 164-73 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1984)).
Ohio has gone further than any other state and it has fixed the duty of care nadir.
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The business judgment rule has been criticized for being inadequate in
the corporate control context. 89 Critics argue that less deference should
be given to decisions concerning the control of a company because of
inherent tendencies toward self-interest by directors who stand to lose
control. To some extent the criticism has been heeded as judicial decisions
involving corporate control have begun to erode the deference given to
directors under the business judgment rule.90
Two recent decisions illustrate the applicability as well as the ade-
quacy of the business judgment rule in the corporate control context. In
Smith v. Van Gorkom,91 the court held that the presumption of the
Furthermore, the standard of care is applied automatically to all Ohio corpora-
tions without shareholder approval. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59 (Anderson Supp. 1986),
enacted as part of Am. Sub. H.B. 902, 116th Gen. Assembly, 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-1096
(Baldwin), virtually eliminates the duty of care in Ohio.
A breach of the duty of care must be supported by clear and convincing evidence which
proves "that the director has not acted in good faith, in a manner he reasonably believes to
be in or not opposed to the best interest of the corporation, or with the care that an ordinary
prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(C)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1986). Moreover, a director's reasonable beliefs may
be based on the affects of a change in control or his termination or potential termination
OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(C)(1)(a)-(c) (Anderson Supp. 1986)
The new Ohio law imposes liability "only if it is proved by clear and convincing evidence
in a court of competent jurisdictions that [a director's] action or failure to act involved an act
or omission undertaken with deliberate intent to cause injury to the corporation or
undertaken with reckless disregard for the best interests of the corporation." Osio REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
The Ohio legislation recognizes that directors are usually better able to make business
judgments than the courts and that liberal duty of care laws are essential to encourage
qualified directors to serve as board members. See Herzel & Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom:
The Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187 (1986).
89 E.g., Note, supra note 76, at 660 ("A less deferential version of the business judgment
rule should be applied [in decisions affecting corporate control] because of the inevitable
self-interest of directors."); Comment, Tender Offer Defenses: The Need for National
Guidelines in Light of Mobil, 21 SAN DiEc.o L. REV. 1151, 1167 (1984)("The business
judgment rule, with its strong presumption of good faith on the part of directors,
is . . . inadequate to address the conflict of interest inherent in tender offer defenses.").
Contra Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 104
(1979)("Takeover bids are not so different from other major business decisions as to warrant
a unique sterilization of the directors in favor of direct action by the shareholders.").
90 Gerlits & Barnard, Poison Pill Defense Lays Open Corporate Boards, Nat'l L.J., May
27, 1985, at 18, col. 1 (Special Section).
9' 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). Van Gorkom involved a bizarre factual setting referred to
by one commentator as a "legal soap opera." Manning, supra note 86, at 1.
Van Gorkom was the president and chairman of the board of directors of Trans Union, a
diversified holding company. Van Gorkom unilaterally decided to contact a potential
acquirer and proposed the sale of Trans Union. 488 A.2d at 866. Ultimately, Van Gorkom
reached an agreement in principle to sell Trans Union without knowledge, consent, or
authorization of other board members. After finalizing the agreement Van Gorkom
convened the board and obtained approval for the sale.
Neither Van Gorkom nor any other board member ever read a proposed or actual sale
19871
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
business judgment rule will not apply when directors exhibit a lack of due
care with respect to their duty to make informed decisions. In Van
Gorkom the business judgment rule was not pierced 92 or circumvented.
Rather, the rule never applied. The merits of the board's decision were
reached only because the rule did not apply.
The principle issue in Van Gorkom was the duty to make an informed
decision. Directors failed to meet the appropriate standard of care with
respect to this duty because they did not perform their functions with the
care that an "ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances."93
In addition to illustrating when the business judgment rule is inappli-
cable, Van Gorkom provides proof of the rule's general adequacy. 94 The
business judgment rule operates in concert with the proper discharge of
the duty of care. In so doing the rule affords directors protection when
protection is consistent with policy objectives, while allowing for com-
plete consideration of the merits of a decision in the breach of duty.
agreement prior to its execution. Van Gorkom made oral representations based on his
discussion with the potential acquirer, but without the benefit of a proposed agreement.
Van Gorkom later executed the agreement at a social event although he had not read it
prior to execution. Id. at 867-69.
The court found that the business judgment rule did not apply because the plaintiffs were
able to show that there was no basis for an informed decision since Trans Union never
formally attempted to assess its stock value. The only analysis made considered only the
feasibility of a leveraged buyout. Post hoc justifications for the sale were rejected on the
basis that the duty to make an informed decision relates to the time of the alleged
dereliction. Id. at 868, 877.
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986), presents a
similar situation with similar results in the context of a lock-up option.
92 Contra Manning, supra note 86, at 1 ("the court there [in Van Gorkom] pierced the
business judgment rule").
91 A.L.I., supra note 84, at 6. A high standard of care was, therefore, warranted because
of both the background and expertise of the Trans Union directors as well as the absence of
compelling circumstances that would create an urgency that would justify a hasty decision.
The board was eminently qualified, and ideally positioned to reach an informed decision,
and it was not impaired from doing so; yet it gave only perfunctory considerations to the sale
agreement.
In an extraordinary decision such as a sale of the corporation, the standard of care will
require that directors perform functions to the utmost of their abilities. Note, supra note 83,
at 987. The decision by Trans Union's directors represents a clear departure from that
standard.
It should be noted that in reaching its decision the Delaware Supreme Court relied on
findings of fact contrary to those established in the Court of Chancery. The dissent bitterly
opposed the majority's evidentiary conclusions and would have held that Trans Union's
directors acted in an informed manner based on its collective experience and longstanding
familiarity with corporate affairs. 488 A.2d at 893-98 (McNeilly, J., dissenting).
94 A $23.5 million settlement was reached in Van Gorkom; the liability imposed will
serve to assure proper respect for the proper discharge of directors' duties. Manning, supra
note 86, at 1 (Editor's note).
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The adequacy of the business judgment rule in the corporate control
context 95 is illustrated in Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co.96
Principally at issue in Unocal was the duty of good faith and disinterested
decision-making. Since the tendencies toward self-interest are inherently
present when control is threatened, the burden of proof evidencing good
faith was shifted to the Unocal directors.97
Unocal illustrates the adaptation of the business judgment rule to the
changing business environment. Control is always a motive in decisions
that impact a corporation's capital structure. 98 The business judgment
rule has evolved to respond to inherent control conflicts precipitated by
business trends to assure the pursuance of directors' duties while serving
to protect the goals and justifications on which the rule is based.99
Once control is identified as a motive the burden of proving an
" Van Gorkom involved uncontested corporate control, but it is discussed primarily to
illustrate when and how the business judgment rule is applied.
96 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, the court held that the directors' duty of care
extends to protecting the corporation from perceived control threats, provided that the
defensive measure is adopted in good faith and on an informed basis. The court further held
that a defensive response to a perceived control threat meets the required standard of care
when it reasonably relates to the threat perceived to shareholders.
Unocal Corporation was faced with a two-tier, front-end loaded tender offer. Unocal's
board of directors immediately met to consider the tender offer. Both Unocal senior
management and its investment bankers surveyed recent industry experience and con-
cluded that the tender offer price did not represent the reasonable value of Unocal's stock.
After consultation with outside counsel, a group of outside directors proposed a defensive
response to the full board. The response was adopted to fulfill a perceived obligation to
protect shareholders from an inadequate price and coercive tactics. Id. at 949.
" In Unocal, the initial burden of proof evidencing good faith that shifted to the
directors required them to demonstrate that they had reasonable ground to believe that a
threat to "corporate policy and effectiveness existed" and that the adopted defensive
measure was reasonable in relation to the perceived threat. But Unocal does not require the
board's justification of the response in light of all other hypothetical responses. The good
faith of the Unocal directors was indicated by their extensive investigation and delibera-
tions prior to reaching a decision. Id. at 955.
The overall reasonableness of the Unocal response to the Mesa tender offer was sustained
on the basis of specific factual circumstances. Unocal directors were required by state
statute to protect the corporation and its shareholder from perceived threats. The past
practices of Mesa and the effect of its current tender offer on Unocal and its shareholders
were extensively considered by the Unocal board prior to reaching a decision. The
conclusion that the Mesa offer was coercive in nature and that it would negatively affect the
Unocal capital structure was consistent with the nature and effect of similar activities
initiated by Mesa. Since the board of directors had become highly informed prior to making
a decision, it was in a good position to decide on a course of action. Furthermore, the court
concluded that the Unocal board of directors had an affirmative duty to act in some manner
with respect to the Mesa tender offer based on analogous statutory requirements which
required director action in traditional areas of corporate change. Id. at 954 n.8.
" Gruenbaum, Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 4 Corn'. L. REv. 263,
265 (1981).
9 See supra text accompanying notes 78-82.
19871
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
absence of self-interest shifts to the directors. The effect of the shift of the
burden of proof was to eliminate the business judgment rule presumption
with respect to good faith. The business judgment rule is the starting
point for inquiry into directors' decision-making process, but the rule does
not excuse directors on the basis of their bare exercise of judgment. 0 0
Shifting burden of proof requirements assures that the existence of good
faith will be assessed as a preliminary matter to assure that a business
judgment is not a pretext for the board's action. 0 1
Refinements of the business judgment rule, demonstrated in Unocal,
reflect the law's propensity toward the balancing of interests. Gauging
the balance or relation between the perceived danger to the corporation
and its shareholders, which implicates a threat to corporate control, and
the resulting directors' decision provides adequate assurance that direc-
tors' duties will be fulfilled in a disinterested manner. Balancing requires
that a decision be reasonable rather than made on a rational basis. This
distinction results in a definite construction of directors' discretion when
corporate control is implicated. 102 Requiring decisions to be reasonable in
relation to perceived harm ensures that directors' decisions will be
limited and responsive to the harm rather than to self-interest concerns.
The balancing that takes place is only a partial balance that does not
attempt to consider the myriad potential decisions within the purview of
management, but requires justifiability in the course chosen. In this
manner, the goals and justifications of the business judgment rule con-
tinue to be protected.
Fully to scrutinize directors is to ignore reality. Corporations cannot
operate on a day-to-day basis.'0 3 Long-range planning is necessary to
optimize profitability. Control is required to implement long range
planning and achieve desired results. Optimization of profits is the duty
of directors. That duty generally requires control. Liability should not be
imposed when not clearly warranted as it would interfere with the
discharge of directors' duties.
The business judgment rule is adequate and proper because it affords
the discretion necessary for corporate growth and productivity while
'o Arsht, supra note 75, at 100.
o Cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 687 (1981)(Rehnquist J.,
dissenting)(Before rational basis deference is given to a state legislature, the Court should
first consider whether safety motivations were merely a pretext for the legislation under
review.).
102 A.L.l., supra note 84, at 10 ("'rational basis' is intended to permit a significantly
wider range of discretion than the term 'reasonable."').
10' Proponents of antitakeover legislation suggest that corporate activity is now driven
by takeover threats. Further, it is asserted that long-term prospects are sacrificed in favor
of short-term considerations. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PAR 1) at 3 (prepared statement of
Timothy Wirth Chairman of the House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and
Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance).
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assuring accountability. The business judgment rule is necessary because
its underlying justifications remain intact despite fundamental changes
in the corporate environment. While the prevailing environment is now
more conducive to corporations in general, the director's duty is still owed
in every context. Complex changes have occurred in the structure and
operation of the corporations extending the director's duty into every new
realm. In light of the ultra-pervasive duties imposed on directors, the
business judgment rule is essential to address the concerns which justify
its existence, and, more importantly, to allow directors to assume those
duties.10 4
The adequacy of the business judgment rule forestalls the need for
antitakeover legislation. In Van Gorkom and Mesa the courts noted that
the outcome of each case turned on the precise factual background of each
case. A congressional mandate cannot be flexible enough to accommodate
equitably specific circumstances which are inevitably different for every
corporation and its shareholders.' 0 5
Even if the business judgment rule were unsatisfactory, it is not clear
beyond debate that further developments will not emanate from the
courts.' 0 6 Unless and until courts fail to be responsive to the ever-
104 Ironically, directors may be under a duty to pursue acquisitions to take advantage of
situations where stock value does not represent the underlying value of a corporation or its
assets. See [19851 12 NAT'L REV. CoRP. ACQUISITIONS (TwEED) No. 32 (Sept. 2, 1985).
Conversely, if takeover trends continue directors may be held liable for failing to adopt
defensive tactics when they would have optimized productivity and growth or liability may
result after defensive tactics are adopted and deemed contrary to the best interests of the
corporation and its shareholders. Bruno, Leidecker, & Forgrimson, Sizing Up Your
Company's Takeover Vulnerability, 20 MERGERs & AcQuismoNs 42 (Summer 1985)(Manage-
ment can handle "its own takeover susceptibility whether it wants to get the highest price
or put up a stout defense.").
1o5 Cf. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HoFsTRA L. REV. 509, 550
(1980)(criticizing the law and economics movement because of its attempts to "globalize"
private disputes).
Proponents of antitakeover legislation argue that the existence of legislative parameters
would deter over abundant or exotic litigation. This argument ignores the obvious
consequences which would doubtless accompany the chilling effect of proposed legislation.
If all litigation and all takeovers could aptly be deemed bad or undesirable, elimination
thereof would clearly be beneficial. But when every instance bears markedly different
consequences and implications a common barrier is no more likely to help than hinder the
effects on the community, management, organized labor, employees, or any other goal
which has been the aim of antitakeover legislation.
106 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. Further developments in the business
judgment rule may be on the horizon. In Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del.
Ch. 1985), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), a stock rights plan was upheld despite the
absence of an imminent takeover threat at the time of adoption.
Moran represents an anomalous situation. The plaintiffs in Moran were one of Household
International's directors and another corporation for which that director served as chair-
man of the board. The plaintiffs were privy to inside information and had contemplated a
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changing business and social environment, directors should be allowed to
set up takeover defenses as they deem appropriate or to adopt takeover
plans pursuant to the best interests of their corporation and shareholders.
Legislation should not help or hinder these duty-based decisions when
there is neither a need to do so nor an equitable means to do so. Congress
should not tie the hands of directors by restricting their options, adding
costs, and increasing uncertainty. 10 7
B. Relative Ability of Courts Over Congress
Congress theoretically has a better decision-making ability than courts
because it has greater resources for gathering and considering facts. 108
Legislation is usually justifiable because Congress is able to conduct a
more complete and thorough appraisal of a particular issue than is
possible in courts. The theoretical superiority of Congress, however, does
not automatically translate into an actual decision-making superior-
ity.1 0 9 Economic and business complexities can create situations involv-
ing diverse and interrelated events such that their implications are not
comprehensible, despite the broad investigative ability of Congress.l1 ° In
leveraged buyout of Household. Thus, Moran was decided under facts which suggest the
breach of a fiduciary duty and reek of the notion of insider trading.
More conventional situations have produced results far less deferential to the corporation
adopting a defense mechanism. In fact, when the sale of control of a corporation becomes
imminent a fiduciary duty to obtain the best possible price for a target corporation's shares
arises. In Revlon Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), a
poison pill and an exchange offer were upheld as reasonable in response to an offer. But a
lock-up option and a no-shop agreement granted to a white knight were unreasonable in
light of an offering price which made the sale of control inevitable. Accord Edelman v.
Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986).
Moreover, over-priced poison pill provisions, which in purpose or effect, deter all hostile
offers will be seen as an entrenchment device and will not be sustained. In Dynamics Corp.
of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986), affg, 637 F. Supp. 406 (N. D. Ill. 1986),
the adoption of a rights plan was enjoined as it was unreasonable under the two-prong
Unocal business judgment rule test. A second rights plan was not enjoined by the district
court. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1174 (N. D. Ill. 1986). But on appeal
the second rights plan was remanded for a determination of the reasonableness of its
triggering percentage and exchange price. Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d
705 (7th Cir. 1986). Accord Buckhorn, Inc. v. Ropak Corp., 656 F. Supp. 209 (S. D. Ohio
1987)(poison pill rights plan enjoined upon the directors failure to meet the burden of
establishing reasonableness), affd, 815 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1987).
Takeover defense tactics-especially the poison pill are also being resisted outside the
courts. Institutional Holders Inked by 'Poison Pill', Wall St. J., Mar. 10, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
Thus, the evolving common law scheme and/or public sentiment may ultimately put an end
to the once exotic business judgment rule litigation emanating from the specter of takeover
threats.
107 See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
108 See supra text accompanying note 55.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
'10 See CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1631 (Comments of Timothy E. Wirth, D-Colo.,
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these situations, Congressional decision-making ability is not superior to
that of the courts.
When the pre-eminent ability of Congress does not result in an
absolute superiority over the courts, the situation is not susceptible to
legislation. When congressional efforts cannot provide a clear answer
truly superior to judicial resolutions, an attempt to provide a broad
resolution is not wise."' Incremental judicial resolution is preferable to
a sweeping legislative mandate because of the risk that legislation may
perpetrate rather than correct a perceived deficiency.
Problems perceived to be incident to recent surges in takeover activity
represent a situation where the theoretical decision-making superiority
of Congress does not translate into an actual decision-making superior-
ity. Congress does not have an actual ability to determine whether
takeovers are inherently good or bad. 112 Congressional consideration of
antitakeover legislation has been marked by an inability to define or
ascertain the existence of a problem worthy of, or susceptible to, legisla-
tive action. This inability is manifested not only by a lack of clear
consensus and absolute differences of opinions, but also by the fact that
the implications associated with takeovers are admittedly not understood
by Congress. 1 3
The inability of Congress to understand the implications of takeover
activity results from the nature of its inquiry. Congress is attempting to
consider takeover activity in aggregate. Takeover activity is not suscep-
tible to collective consideration because takeovers per se are not inher-
ently good or bad." 4 The merits of a takeover can only be assessed
individually. Only the context in which each individual event occurs can
determine the merits of a particular action.
Congress has doubtless been influenced by individual instances which
represent extreme cases that should not form the basis for overall
policy."15 Media depictions of takeover activity suggest that abuses are
widespread and that legislation is urgently needed. The extremes repre-
sented by these depictions, however, are not indicative of takeover ability
Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee)(Despite in-depth hearings,
he is not sure that any legislation is necessary).
111 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
112 See supra note 110.
113 CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1631 (comments of Rep. Mike Synar, D-Okla.). See
generally CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PART 1 & 2) (extremely divergent views on various aspects
of takeovers were expressed by participants in the Congressional hearings).
114 Market Madness: No Easy Answers, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 30 (comments of district
court Judge Sweet). See also Roundtable: Corporate Techniques in Acquisitions and
Divestitures, 20 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 24, 24-36 (Spring 1985).
Takeover activity may be susceptible to administrative restraints, but legislation does
not propose such treatment. But see supra notes 40 & 41.
11 M & A Legislation Debated, 19 MERGERS & AcQUISIONs 4 (Winter 1985).
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in general. The consensus of participants in takeover activity, who form
opinions based on experience and observation rather than media hype, is
that contested takeovers represent a small part of all mergers and
acquisitions. Participants admit that some abuses occur in takeover
situations, but the abuses are rare and not susceptible to legislation.
Congress should accept its limitations with candor and defer to courts
in the resolution of takeover disputes. The complex and varying nature
and goals of every corporate organization limit the applicability of
comprehensive legislation. Individual corporations are in the best posi-
tion to guide and control their own destinies. Obviously, an acquisition
decision by one corporation creates consequences which may not be
desirable for another corporation. When disputes arise and they cannot
be privately resolved, the traditional resort has been to the courts.
Courts, rather than Congress, are the best forum for takeover disputes.
Courts are better equipped to analyze the individual factual settings in
which takeovers occur. Ad hoc judicial decisions are capable of resolving
extreme cases as well as cases falling within a middle ground.116
The movement for antitakeover legislation should be viewed in proper
perspective. Despite evidence that takeovers create benefits to sharehold-
ers by causing stock prices to rise, antitakeover legislation has been
initiated under the guise of shareholder protection. Congressional impe-
tus for legislation emerges chiefly from the pleas of corporate manage-
ment, while shareholders, whose interests are presumably in need of
protection have seldom voiced their opinion. 117
Given the inherent decision-making superiority of Congress, it is
significant that it has not been able to conclude that takeovers are in fact
detrimental, nor has it been able to formulate a legislative approach
capable of applying equitably to all circumstances. 118 Under these
conditions, Congress should be candid and abstain from passing legisla-
tion since it cannot fully comprehend the implications of the matter in
question. Otherwise, problems greater than those perceived to accom-
pany takeovers may result.119 Accordingly, Congress should defer to the
courts rather than respond to pressure from business interests.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
117 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 203 (1985); CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1631-36. "Mast of
the proposed laws were introduced by Congressmen from districts where an unfriendly
takeover sent management scurrying to Washington for protection. Tinkering Around
With Corporate Takeovers, FORTUNE 101 (Feb. 3, 1986); Goodyear Asks for Help in Preventing
Takeover, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1986, at 24, col. 3.
" See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
19 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
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C. Implications of Antitakeover Legislation
1. Economic Effects
a. Economic Benefits of Takeovers
Evidence indicates that takeovers produce substantial wealth to share-
holders and result in an aggregate net benefit to the economy.120
Economic benefits result from takeover activity through efficiency gains
created by volume production and distribution systems. Takeovers can
produce economies of scale which create opportunities which would
otherwise be unavailable. 121 Further opportunities may become available
through technology transfers not possible between unrelated corpora-
tions. An increased market share that occurs after an acquisition
produces per unit cost reductions capable of offsetting higher consumer
prices usually associated with oligopolous industries.
Takeovers can produce substantial economic gains by causing assets to
be shifted to higher valued uses. 12 2 Optimization of asset-use potential
will result from the combined corporations' ability to capitalize on
alternate opportunities previously unavailable on a stand-alone basis.
Economic gains may stem from actual utilization or increased market
valuation based on greater use potential.
Takeovers also encourage management improvements. 123 Inefficient
management can be displaced or supplemented by talented professional
managers who can implement new corporate strategies. "The dominant
view, for which empirical studies have provided support, is that mergers
and takeovers primarily reflect efforts to wrest corporate control from
inefficient, entrenched management in order to realize the full potential
of a firm's assets.''124
Management has an inherent tendency to protect its own interests,
rather than the interests of shareholders. Management may resist
economically beneficial business combinations to perpetuate itself. A
takeover, or the threat of a takeover, therefore, tends to cause an
alignment of management and shareholder interests. 25 The potential
occurrence of a takeover will cause management to adopt capital struc-
tures responsive to existing financial conditions. A capital structure that
comports to the prevailing financial environment will enhance stock
120 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 197 (1985).
121 CONG. Q. Aug. 17, 1985, at 1633.
122 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 197 (1985).
12' Tender Offer Law Under Fire, 20 MERGERS & AcQUISITIONS 9 (Spring 1985); CONG. Q.,
Aug. 17, 1985, at 1633.
124 Staff Studies, 73 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 270 (1987).
12' ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 188 (1985).
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value, thereby benefitting shareholders, while simultaneously serving as
an efficient takeover defense.126
b. Economic Consequences of Shareholder Tender Offer Approval
The effect of requiring shareholder approval prior to the completion of
a tender offer will be to reduce the number of takeovers. Regardless of the
manner in which shareholders ultimately vote on any particular tender
offer, the requirement of shareholder approval would make takeovers
more difficult. The extended time period necessarily involved in the
shareholder approval process would deny the potential acquirer of both
secrecy and speed as well as imposing additional costs and increased
risk.127
Legislation would impose artificial costs to a potential acquirer.
Increasing the time period for completion of a tender offer in order to poll
shareholders would allow management of the target company to avert the
tender offer. Target management would have additional time to imple-
ment defensive tactics or to seek an alternate buyer.12S Potential acquir-
ers would be forced to pay higher premiums to overcome defensive tactics
or to abandon the takeover attempt. The increased premiums then
required would cause a reduction in takeover volume. Thus, individual
gains to a small number of shareholders would be greater, but aggregate
gains among all shareholders would be reduced with decreased takeover
volume.
The possibility of a takeover represents an important check on man-
agement. 129 A reduced possibility of takeover would cause management
to become entrenched and lack incentive for growth. Antitakeover
legislation would shield management from m~rket disciplines which
would have required productivity. Since shareholders are effectively
precluded from removing incumbent management due to the prohibitive
126 Id. at 189; Roundtable: Strategies of Takeover Attack and Defense, 19 MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS 24, 33 (Winter 1985).
127 Austin & Bernard, Tender Offer Update: 1985, 20 MERGERS & ACQusToNs 67, 67-69
(Spring 1985).
12 Shot-Gun Weddings, [1985] 12 NAT'L REV. CoRP. AcQUISmONS (TWEED) No. 10 (Mar. 11,
1985).
129 E.g., Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110
(1965). At the time of Manne's article, mergers rather than tender offers were the principal
means to effect takeovers. Changed market conditions have made the tender offer the
principal means of effecting takeovers at the current time. See supra note 17 and
accompanying text. Even proponents of antitakeover legislation recognize that takeovers
represent an important mode of assuring management accountability. CORPORATE TAKEOVERS
(PART 2) at 2 (Statement of Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum)(also expressing the opinion
that shareholders need protection to assure fair and equitable treatment).
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expense of a proxy fight, 130 management would not be compelled to
enhance stock value.
The possibility of a takeover forces management to be efficient. The
threat of a potential takeover causes management action to avoid
vulnerability. The best defense against a takeover is a high stock
value.13 1 The stock market determines stock value, therefore, it is the
stock market and not voting that protects shareholders. 132 Accordingly,
antitakeover legislation should not be passed since it would adversely
affect shareholders.
Economic forces also forestall the need for antitakeover legislation.
Recent surges in acquisition activity are an economic phenomena. The
four major waves of acquisition activity have occurred during periods of
heightened economic activity. 33 The current wave of activity will inev-
itably pass.
Takeovers themselves will seek an equilibrium. The efficiency of the
market has made it difficult for acquisitions to pay off financially. 134
Evidence suggests that acquisition activity has peaked. 35 These self-
limiting economic factors combined with efficient defensive tactics pre-
clude any need for antitakeover legislation.
2. Effects on Shareholder Rights
a. Expansion of Shareholders Voting Rights
America's genius ... lies in not taking any abstract doctrine to
its logical extreme.136
A corporation is a nexus for contracts. 37 An essential party of the
nexus is the contractual relationship between the corporation and share-
holders. The contract provides for separation of ownership and manage-
ment and, in turn, grants to shareholders certain rights, including the
right to vote in limited circumstances.
'" During the 1970s the sophisticated use of the proxy machinery enabled shareholders
to "assert the slumbering powers of shareholder democracy." CORPORATE TAKEOVERS (PAr 1)
at 613-14 (address of Bevis Longstreth). Notwithstanding the potential efficacy of the proxy
as a vehicle to effect shareholder sentiment, substantial costs often render a proxy fight
impracticable.
131 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 189 (1985).
132 Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 395, 397 (1983).
133 See supra text accompanying notes 1-13.
134 Roundtable: Corporate Techniques in Acquisitions and Divestitutes, 20 MERGERS &
AcQuIsIToNs 24, 26 (Spring 1985)(Comments of Arthur A. Just, Manager of Investment
Strategy, General Electric Co.).
"' CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1636.
136 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGrs SERIOUSLY 20 (1977).
' Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 29 J. L. &
ECON. 179 (1985).
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Traditionally voting rights have been given to holders of common stock
while voting rights have less frequently been given to preferred stock and
bond holders. 138 State statutes have given corporations broad latitude in
delegating voting rights.139 Despite the broad latitude afforded corpora-
tions by state statutes, almost all publicly held corporations have adopted
a uniform voting scheme to comply with stock exchange rules. Share-
holders elect directors who, in turn, select management.140 Shareholders
vote on a limited number of issues at an annual meeting, but special
elections are not otherwise held.
State law has shaped the issues upon which shareholders have tradi-
tionally voted.141 The basic issues on which shareholders vote are actions
that involve fundamental corporate changes, such as mergers, liquida-
tions, and charter amendments. 142 Shareholder voting has been required
in these situations because they have been considered extraordinary in
nature. Shareholder voting is not required by state law and is not
otherwise granted to shareholders for general business decisions.1 43
Shareholders delegate decision-making authority via their election of
the board of directors.- 4 This delegation results in a separation of
ownership and management, and the purpose of which is to optimize
efficiency. a45 Efficiency results from placing the individuals best suited to
run the company in management positions. 146 Delegation permits spe-
cialization which enables management to develop talent and knowledge
13' Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 395, 403 (1983).
139 Id. at 399.
140 Id. at 400.
141 Id. at 415.
142 Fundamental corporate changes have not traditionally included takeovers. Only
major corporate changes initiated by management have been subject to shareholder
approval. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1070 (Del. Ch. 1985)("shareholders
do not possess a contractual right to receive takeover bids"), affd, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del.
1985).
Takeovers are not a fundamental change and they do not warrant shareholder approval.
Takeovers are a corporate opportunity and consequence which results from the careful
planning of an acquirer as well as the actions and inactions of the target corporation and the
market and economic conditions. Conversely, mergers and consolidations involve negotia-
tions and prospective decisions which must necessarily involve bilateral shareholder
approval.
143 Shareholder approval of certain transactions may be obtained in order to avoid legal
liability. However, shareholders generally cannot ratify fraud and courts will scrutinize
actions that may be motivated by self interest. See Flieger v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del.
1976)(scrutiny of potential self-interest); Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (Del Ch. 1962)(waste
of corporate assets cannot be ratified without unanimous shareholder consent). See also
Claman v. Robertson, 164 Ohio St. 61, 128 N.E.2d 429 (1955)(disinterested majority of
shareholders can ratify director's fraud).
144 EcON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 187 (1985).
14' Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 375,
376 (1983).
1 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 138, at 427.
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necessary for the operation of large, complex business organizations. 147
Shareholders benefit through the greater expertise gained by manage-
ment. The corporation also realizes a cost savings because the discretion
afforded by shareholder delegation of decision-making authority reduces
the number of items to be negotiated in business decisions. 148
The effect of antitakeover legislation which requires shareholder
approval prior to completion of a tender offer is the expansion of the
voting rights of shareholders. The additional voting right would be
imposed on corporations without its consent. The additional right would
at least theoretically enhance the stock value to the shareholder,149 but
without compensation to the corporation.
A shareholder's decision to purchase stock in a particular company is
an entirely voluntary choice. At the time of purchase a shareholder
enters into a limited contractual relationship with the company. The
terms of the contractual relationship are formed by state law and
corporate charter provisions, and the contract itself authorizes the
corporation to make all decisions not otherwise expressly provided.'
5 0
An expansion of shareholder voting rights after a contractual relation-
ship is created is not necessary. Dissatisfied shareholders have ample
opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with management or take
steps to protect their interests. Prior to purchasing stock, a potential
investor has the ability to obtain ample information on the company it is
considering. 151 Financial information and charter provisions can provide
an investor with a basis to determine whether the allocation of rights and
the corresponding benefits which accompany stock ownership comport
with one's conception of equity. After shares are purchased, any changes
in charter provisions will be subjected to shareholder scrutiny. If the
shareholder does not approve of a particular charter amendment, the
votes allotted to its shares provide the means to oppose such changes. A
shareholder also has the option to sell its shares at any time and invest
elsewhere.
Given the limited contractual relationship between a corporation and
its shareholders, changes in that relationship should only occur incre-
mentally through existing rights of shareholders. 152 Shareholders are
"I7 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT 180 (1985).
148 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 138, at 401.
All other things being equal, a share is worth more when accompanied by voting
rights. See Bhaget & Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder
Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & EcoN. 339, 340-41 (1984).
ise Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 138, at 402.
151 Cf. Baysinger & Butler, supra note 137, at 191 (Shareholders have the choice to invest
in firms incorporated in strict corporate jurisdictions).
152 The proper balance between shareholder control and management discretion permits
effective management. Unnegotiated changes in the relationship between shareholders and
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granted voting rights to the extent that they are beneficial to the entire
enterprise. 153 The limited voting rights granted to shareholders corre-
spond to the limited liability and accountability of shareholders. Con-
versely, management is held accountable for its actions and may be
subject to liability. Shareholder voting as prescribed in antitakeover
legislation would grant authority without imposing accountability and it
will undermine the corporate benefit motive behind the initial limita-
tions on shareholder voting.
The purported goal of granting shareholders the right to approve
takeovers is to provide them with a means of protection against takeovers
that would not be beneficial. In reality a shareholder's new-found right
would be of little value. Shareholders have consistently manifested
indifference toward voting matters and they have traditionally sided
with management in voting situations.154
Proponents of regulations that expand voting rights ignore the realities
of shareholder voting and instead assume that shareholders demand
more involvement in the corporate decision making process. 155 It is
further assumed that shareholder indifference to voting is attributable to
defects in the regulatory process. It is argued that the lack of shareholder
involvement is due to the lack of information necessary to vote intelli-
gently on corporate activities. Thus, additional disclosures have been
called for as a means to prompt shareholders to vote in a meaningful
way. 156
Increased disclosure, along with additional voting rights, will not add
significance to shareholder voting. Shareholders lack the incentive and
expertise to identify and evaluate takeover implications. The complex
nature of business combinations cannot be comprehended by most share-
holders.157 Hence, disclosures will be of little or no value to shareholders.
Shareholders will be subjected to disclosures from management and from
the bidding corporation. 158 Disclosures will only create confusion among
shareholders. Conflicting viewpoints will be advanced by management
and the bidder. Each viewpoint will be equally supported by factual
information. The complexity of disclosures would be congruous to the
complexity of the transaction proposed. Disclosure is not susceptible to
simplification, because simplification inherently injects the subjectivity
a corporation would adversely affect management efficiency. See Baysinger & Butler, supra
note 137, at 180.
153 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 138, at 396.
154 Id.
151 Id. at 424.
..6 Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management
Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 555, 605-12 (1981).
157 Cf. CONG. Q., Aug. 17, 1985, at 1631 (Highly educated and experienced Congressmen
are unable to comprehend the implications of takeovers).
158 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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of the preparer. Increased disclosures will not add significance to share-
holder voting rights because they will only inform shareholders who have
expertise and would have otherwise sought out information through
existing channels.
Apart from the questionable informational value of disclosures is the
matter of costs. Since disclosure is costly and must be borne by investors,
increased disclosure will ultimately be detrimental to shareholders. 159 In
addition to costs actually incurred in the disclosure process, there may be
a deterrent effect on profit-maximizing activity. Required disclosures
may cause corporations to forego takeovers or other activities which
might be profitable. Disclosure costs in dollars spent and dollars foregone
may exceed the benefits or increase the risks of a proposed activity. 160
The expansion of shareholder rights would also act to deny stock
market participants their expectation of profit. 16 The effect of the time
delay required for shareholder voting would provide corporations with
the ability to restrict their stock sales. Corporations could use the interim
voting period to persuade its shareholders not to accept the tender offer,
or find an alternate purchaser while simultaneously mounting a defen-
sive response to the tender offer.
When a corporation opts to place its shares on a public market,
legislation should not provide a means for corporations to restrict stock
sales. Once a corporation reaps the benefits of the public market it should
also accepts its risks. Predominant among the risks assumed by publicly
traded companies is the loss of corporate control. Aside from choosing
non-public status,162 corporations can adopt charter provisions or capital
structures which will prevent takeovers. Both measures would require
shareholder approval, but the protection afforded to shareholders
through voting rights would not then interfere with reasonable expecta-
tions investors have on the public stock market.
The corporate structure has worked well for a long time without
granting shareholders the right to approve takeovers. Experience has
indicated that shareholders do not want additional voting rights. Fur-
thermore, shareholders cannot effectively utilize the right to approve
takeovers. Moreover, additional voting rights will undermine the funda-
mental purpose that initially limited voting rights, namely efficiency
optimization. 63
' Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 138, at 424.
160 Id.
16" Even a would-be raider has had the traditional right to accumulate stock in a free
market atmosphere. [19841 11 NAT'L REV. CoRP. ACQUISITIONS (TWEED) No. 46 (Dec. 3, 1984).
162 Many firms are "Going Private" to avoid control problems or to create employee
ownership. [1984] 11 NAT'L REV. CoRP. AcQUISrONS (TWEED) No. 39 (Oct. 15, 1984).
163 See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
At least one commentator has questioned the wisdom of shareholder voting in all
circumstances. Professor Chayes perceives as futile the efforts to revive shareholder
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b. Impairment of Shareholder Property Rights
The primarily economic responsibility of the federal government
is not to make choices for people, but to provide an environment in
which people can make their own choices.164
The powers of corporate democracy have long been at the disposal of
shareholders. 165 Proponents of antitakeover legislation providing for
shareholder approval of takeovers seek something very different. If
successful, the results will benefit incumbent management to the detri-
ment of shareholders.1 6 6 The realities ignored by proponents of
antitakeover legislation make it apparent that they "are using the
rhetoric of shareholder's democracy to further goals other than wealth
maximization." 167
Calls for corporate democracy have argued that poison pill stock rights
plans deny shareholders the exercise of private property rights.168 Voting
rights and restrictions are contractual in nature; such rights and restric-
tions co-exist with ownership of the corporation. Accordingly, voting
rights need not be protected to the extent of private property rights.169
Ironically, antitakeover legislation, initiated under the guise of share-
holder protection, 170 would impair private property rights in an effort to
bolster less valuable contractual rights.171 An expansion of shareholder
democracy. Additionally, he believes "that the stockholder deserves his voiceless position in
the corporation, because he is less affected by the giant corporation than other
persons-employees, suppliers, customers, and the community." Kripke, The SEC, Corpo-
ration Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173, 177 (1981)(emphasis
original)(citation omitted).
164 EcoN. REP. OF THE PREsiDENT 4 (1985)(President Ronald Reagan, in a message to the
Congress of the United States).
1s Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984)(If stockholders are displeased with
the action of their elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their
disposal to turn the board out.); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1977)("Act-
ing through their power to elect the Board of Directors or to insist upon protective
provisions on the corporation's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to
protect their own interest.").
166 For instance, proposed antitakeover legislation would afford management time and
flexibility enabling it to forestall takeover attempts, while shareholders would obtain new
voting rights of questionable value, and tenderor purchase restrictions would seriously
impair their ability to sell their stock. See supra text accompanying note 32.
167 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 138, at 424 n.84.
155 Middleton, supra note 26, at 28 (Plaintiffs oral argument in Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. Ch. 1985)).
159 See A. BERLE & G. MFANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPErtY 355
(1932)(Shareholders have "released the community from the obligation to protect them to
the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights.").
170 See supra text accompanying note 117.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 154-58.
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voting rights as prescribed by proposed legislation 172 would simulta-
neously restrict the shareholder's right to sell his stock under the
favorable conditions present during a takeover bid. Legislation that
makes it unlawful to buy or take delivery of stock prior to shareholder
approval of a tender offer necessarily restricts a shareholder's ability to
sell. Antitakeover legislation, in effect, represents a poison pill that
would impose a predetermined restriction on shareholders' property
rights during a takeover bid, but without requiring their prior contrac-
tual consent.
The thrust of federal securities regulations has always been to require
disclosures sufficient to allow individual investors to make individual
investment decisions. 173 Legislative proposals are directly contrary to
this long-standing notion. They would provide shareholders in aggregate
with the means to make investment decisions which would bind all
shareholders. Proposed departures from traditional methods of securities
regulation effectively represent a serious impairment of shareholder
property rights. Should corporate democracy be adopted, as intimated by
proposed antitakeover legislation, the loss of valuable property rights
would be accompanied by little, if any, shareholder protection.
3. Concurrent Effect of Tax Law Changes
Federal tax consequences are an important factor in corporate take-
overs. Certain features of the tax code may have an impact on takeover
activity in general, and on the attractiveness of particular takeovers. The
general organization of the tax code indirectly affects aggregate takeover
activity, while specific code provisions more directly affect the merits of
particular takeovers.
The general organization of the tax code has indirectly contributed to
increased acquisition activity by prescribing different tax treatment for
corporate and individual taxpayers as well as among types of taxable
events. 174 Interest paid by a corporation to a debt security holder is not
172 See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
113 E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982)("Congress intended for investors
to be free to make their own decisions."); Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp.
742, 758 (S. D. Ohio 1986)("permitting the investor to make his or her own independent
decision"), affd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); Martin-
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 567 (6th Cir. 1982)(congressional policy
permits each individual investor "to make his own independent but informed decision
whether to sell."); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1276 (5th Cir. 1978)("let
the investor decide for himself.")(emphasis original), rev'd sub. nom Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979)(reversed on venue grounds).
174 JoiNT COMMrrrEE ON TAXATION, FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF HOSILE TAKEOVERS AND
OTHER CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQUISMONS (AND S. 476, AND S. 632) (JCS - 985) 4-5 (Apr. 19,
1985).
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taxed at the corporate level because the interest is deductible from the
corporation's revenues. 75 Dividends paid by a corporation are, con-
versely, taxed at the corporate level prior to distribution to shareholders.
Thus, dividends are subject to a "double tax" as they are also taxed at the
individual level. 17 6 Corporate income not distributed to shareholders will
be taxed at the individual level only when appreciated stock value is
realized upon a sale or disposition of stock.'7 7 Prior to 1987, realized
appreciation was afforded favorable tax treatment at the individual level,
therefore, reinvestment of corporate earnings, rather than distribution in
the form of dividend was encouraged by the general organization of the
tax code.178
Limited investment opportunities or liquidity concerns may lead to
cash accumulations at the corporate level.179 Cash accumulations serve
the dual purposes of making acquisitions possible for a bidder with excess
cash and of making a target with excess cash especially attractive.8 0
The general deductibility of interest is another factor that encourages
acquisitions. Interest deductibility affects corporate takeovers in a two-
fold manner. First, it enables a company to finance a takeover by
subsidizing debt financing via the deductibility of interest payments. 8 1
Second, it produces a relative advantage for companies with a high
debt-to-equity ratio. Since debt financed takeovers effectively increase
the debt-to-equity ratio of an acquired corporation, a takeover may
increase stock price to reflect the tax advantages associated with the debt
financing.182
Although takeovers are often motivated by many non-tax factors,
specific tax code provisions have, in the past, directly enhanced the
merits of a particular acquisition.183 "The carryover of tax attributes from
one company to another can lead to the acquisition of corporations
"'5 Direct deductibility of interest payments allows corporations to effectively distribute
pre-tax revenues. See I.R.C. § 162 (1986); I.R.C. § 163 (1986).
' See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7)(1984). But see THE PRESiEN'Ts TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR
FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SuspLucrry 120-29 (1985)(proposed reduction of double taxation of
corporate earnings distributed to shareholders).
177 JOINT COMMrrrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 174, at 5.
178 See I.R.C. § 1202(a)(1984). The Section 1202(a) capital gain deduction was eliminated
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 311,100 Stat. 2085 (1986); Conference
Report to 1986 Act at I-106. Reinvestment of corporate earnings continues to be encour-
aged by the greater profit-making ability of the corporation over alternative investment
opportunities available to investors.
179 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 174, at 506.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 5, 45-47. Thus, an acquirer may be able to obtain a company for less than its
underlying asset value or below its price per earnings ratio while effectively paying only a
portion of the financing cost. See supra text accompanying note 17.
182 JoINT CoMMrrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 174, at 5.
183 Id. at 9.
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primarily because of these attributes."'' 8 4 The most commonly sought
after tax attributes are the net operating loss and investment tax
credits. 18
5
Tax attributes inherently may be more valuable to one company than
to another. For example, a net operating loss would be more valuable to
a company with excessive income and may possibly cause a more
favorable tax rate to be applied.18 6 Similarly, because an investment tax
credit is non-refundable in nature, its complete utilization can only occur
when tax liability either equals or exceeds the amount of the credit.'l s
Thus, companies may have credits currently unavailable for use which
would be readily available to companies with sufficient taxable income.
Favorable tax attributes can reach a magnitude such that they cannot be
ignored as a potential inducement for takeovers.
Although the Tax Reform Act of 1986188 emanated from a social change
philosophy and was designed for general reform purposes, the Act
forecloses many of the incentives which have previously condoned take-
over activity. The long-standing General Utilities doctrine was substan-
tially repealed.18 9 The repeal of the General Utilities doctrine will
discourage takeovers by substantially increasing the tax cost of acquisi-
tions.
Tax costs in asset purchases will increase because a target or selling
corporation will now be taxed on the gain from the sale. Stock purchases
become less advantageous because the acquiring corporation must either
forego a favorable tax basis and depreciation deductions, or the sale will
be fully taxable 90 as if it were an asset purchase. In any event, the
additional tax cost must be borne by the acquiring corporation, and the
effect of the additional cost will discourage takeover activity. 191
184 B. BITrKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
2-30 (4th ed. 1979). But see I.R.C. § 383 (1986); I.R.C. § 382 (1986); I.R.C. § 269 (1986)(code
limitations on the use of net operating losses, excess credits, and built-in losses).
18' Favorable basis and non-recognition of gain provisions may also have existed. See
I.R.C. § 338 (1984); I.R.C. § 337 (1984). See also JoIr COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note
174, at 7, 10, 11, 23 37. But see I.R.C. § 47 (1984); I.R.C. § 1245 (1986); I.R.C. § 1250
(1986)(provisions for recapture of depreciation deductions and investment tax credits).
186 See I.R.C. § 172 (1986)(net operating loss deduction); I.R.C. § 11 (1986)(corporate tax
rate schedule).
187 See I.R.C. § 38(c)(1984)(general business credit limitation).
'a Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986)[hereinafter 1986 Act].
's General Util. Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200 (1935)(holding that a
corporation realizes no taxable income on a distribution with respect to its stock).
19o 1986 Act § 631; Conference Report to 1986 Act at 11-198; [1986] 13 Nat'l Rev. Corp.
Acquisitions (TwEED) No. 33 (Sept. 8, 1986). See also I.R.C. § 338 (1986)(deemed asset
acquisition pursuant to the operative provisions of I.R.C. §§ 336 & 337, as amended by 1986
Act § 631).
9 ' See Faber, The Search for Consistency in Corporate Acquisitions, 13 J. CORP. TAX'N
187, 232 & n.102 (1986)(acquisitions will be seriously disadvantaged if tax consequences
cause carryover-basis acquisitions to become the norm).
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Takeovers will be further discouraged by tightened restrictions on the
use of net operating loss carryovers. Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of
1986 limit the availability of net operating losses to offset income of the
acquiring corporation.192 Hence, the effective cost of takeovers is again
effectively increased and takeover activity is further discouraged.
Various tax reform proposals, other than the 1986 Act, have specifi-
cally sought to restrict or remove beneficial tax attributes and to impose
taxes specifically designed to disfavor "hostile" takeovers. Several pro-
posed bills, specifically designed to apply to "hostile" takeovers, would
disallow interest deductions on indebtedness used to finance takeovers
deemed hostile.19S
Regardless of whether these tax proposals are viewed as imposing a
new tax or eliminating current preferential treatment, their effect clearly
would negatively impact the desirability of all takeovers. The immediate
impact would be to discourage the economically desirable takeover.19 4 In
the process shareholder wealth would suffer as shareholders would be
precluded from profits which could have resulted from takeover premi-
ums or from the increased profitability attainable through efficiencies
which can be created by combined resources.
More importantly, tax law changes may produce adverse long range
effects. Once enacted into law, it is likely that they would remain in effect
indefinitely. 195 As economic conditions change, environmental factors
may not inherently favor takeovers and new restraints would place
unneeded burdens on potential takeovers. 196 Moreover, if both tax based
and general antitakeover legislation become effective, the concurrent
192 1986 Act § 621; Conference Report to 1986 Act at 11-170, 172 ("After an ownership
change . . the taxable income of a loss corporation available for offset by pre-acquisition
NOL carry forward is annually limited to a prescribed rate times the value of the loss
corporation's stock on the date of the ownership change.").
193 JoINT Co mirrEE ON TAXATION, supra note 174, at 55-56 ("A 'hostile offer' is defined as
an offer to acquire stock of a corporation if such offer is disapproved by a majority of the
continuing independent members of a corporation's board of directors."). I.R.C. § 279 (1986),
currently limits the interest on "corporate acquisition indebtedness", but its narrow scope
has made its limitations easy to award. M. KATZ & R. LOEB, AcQUISMONS AND MERGERS 133
(1985).
Since these proposed bills only remove the bias favoring debt financing, they would
effectively create a defense or bargaining tactic for a target corporation. Conceivably, target
corporations could negotiate an increased offering price on the basis of the tax consequences
which would correspond to their disapproval of an offer.
Rather than discriminating against hostile takeovers, these proposals should seek to
eliminate the bias favoring debt financing. A better approach would be to make reforms
which favor equity financing without regard for the context in which the financing occurs.
194 See supra text accompanying notes 120-27.
i55 See supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 1-17 and accompanying text.
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effect will severely curtail takeover activity. In the future, foreclosed
takeover options will result in foregone growth and productivity.
Finally, specific tax legislation which would disallow acquisition
related interest deductions are founded on a more flawed basis than
general antitakeover legislation. 197 The merits of a particular takeover,
or takeovers in general, bear no relation to whether they meet with the
approval of target board members. Taxes imposed on this faulty basis
would license motivations based solely on retaining control and ignore
community impact concerns which comprise a major part of general
antitakeover legislation.
198
"[O]ne thing is clear: the effect of tax and regulatory policies on the
market for corporate control is an issue of significant economic and
political consequence." 199 Proposed antitakeover legislation of both the
tax and regulatory nature is ill-conceived and would discourage benefi-
cial takeover activity. Neither category of legislative proposals seeks to
address the particular merits of a given takeover attempt, opting instead
to comprehensively encumber all takeover activity. The concurrent effect
of tax law changes, with respect to hostile takeovers, along with enact-
ment of regulatory antitakeover legislation would bind the future to rules
not now necessary, and their adverse effects would leave the future fated
with foregone wealth.
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SECOND GENERATION STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
[A] law can be both economic folly and constitutional.2 00
In CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of America20 1 the Su-
preme Court pronounced the constitutional validity of a second genera-
tion state takeover statute. 20 2 The constitutional validity of the Indiana
Control Share Acquisition Act2o 3 was sustained despite the recognition
197 See supra text accompanying notes 154-60.
198 See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
199 JoiNT CoMmrrrEE ON TAXATON, supra note 174, at 3.
200 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1653 (1987)(Scalia, J.,
concurring), rev'g, 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986).
201 Id.
202 See supra note 23. Control Share Acquisition Acts similar to the Indiana Act at issue
in CTS had previously been struck down as unconstitutional. Fleet Aerospace Corp. v.
Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S. D. Ohio 1986), affd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986), vacated,
107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987); APL Ltd. Partnership v. Van Dusen Air, Inc., 622 F. Supp. 1216 (D.
Minn. 1985); Icahn v. Blunt 612 F. Supp. 1400 (D. Mo. 1985). But see Terry v. Yamashita
643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Hawaii 1986)(striking down Hawaii's statute), rev'd, 788 F.2d 1566
(9th Cir. 1986).
203 IsD. CODE §§ 23-1-17-1 et seq. (Supp. 1986).
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that "[v]ery few tender offers could turn the gauntlet that Indiana has set
up. 204
The opinion of the Court is replete with rhetoric which echoes the
ostensible purpose of the Indiana Act: "The primary purpose of the Act is
to protect the shareholders of Indiana corporations. '20 5 Repeated refer-
ence to the purported purpose of the Act shroud the essence of the Court's
commerce clause validation of the Indiana Act. To sustain its commerce
clause validity, the Indiana Act needed to bear only a modicum of
rationality.20 6 Disparate authorities on the merits and demerits of tender
offers afforded the scant threat of rationality necessary for the Court to
conclude that the Act's purpose is not illusory and that "Indiana has a
substantial interest in preventing the corporate form from becoming a
shield for unfair business dealing."20 7
CTS also sustained the Indiana Act on pre-emption grounds. In
practical effect, the Indiana Act delays completion of a tender offer until
fifty days after commencement. 20 8 The Court found the Act's fifty day
period not in conflict with the shorter minimum tender offer period of
twenty days and the longer maximum sixty day period for tender offers.
The twenty day minimum tender offer period was not deemed to
present a conflict because conditional tender offers, as permitted by
Williams Act regulations, were not precluded by the Indiana Act.209
Further, the Court concluded that the sixty-day maximum tender offer
period established the reasonable time period during which a tender offer
could be delayed without pre-empting the Williams Act. In effect, the
Court equated the permissive maximum tender offer period prescribed by
the Williams Act with the mandatory minimum period of delay imposed
by the Indiana Act. Thus, the Court's conclusion that a delay within the
maximum Williams Act is not unreasonable 210 is a non sequitur.
204 CTS, 107 S. Ct. at 1643 (quoting the Seventh Circuit, 794 F.2d at 263). The Indiana
Act deprives acquirers of control shares (twenty percent of the outstanding stock) of voting
powers unless a majority of disinterested shareholders vote to authorize control share
voting powers.
205 107 S. Ct. at 1651.
206 Upon finding that the Indiana Act did not subject activities to inconsistent regula-
tions, 107 S. Ct. at 1649, the remaining commerce clause obstacle was the Pike v. Druce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), balancing of the effect on commerce with putative local
benefits. Rational basis deference to legislative findings and purpose rendered the Court's
further commerce clause analysis a perfunctory discourse. See South Carolina State
Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
207 107 S. Ct. at 1651-52.
20. The Act's practical effect was the basis for the Seventh Circuit's invalidation. 107 S.
Ct. at 1645; 794 F.2d at 263.
209 107 S. Ct. at 1647.
210 Id. The court further concluded that the unquestioned validity of state corporation
statutes which delay the time when a successful tender offeror takes control indicate a
congressional intent not to pre-empt state laws which delay the acquisition of post tender
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A majority of the Court concluded that the Indiana Act paralleled
Williams Act purposes by placing disinterested shareholders, in aggre-
gate, on an equal footing with a takeover bidder.2 11 But the majority
failed to address formidable arguments presented in the dissenting
opinion. The Williams Act intended to protect individual shareholders. 212
The Indiana Act, however, protects target corporations while serving to
"protect" individual shareholders only by preventing them from selling
stock at a premium.
The opinion of the Court suggests that shareholders, in aggregate,
would or should act in the best interest of the corporation to reject an offer
which might be accepted by an individual shareholder. 213 But minority
shareholders do not owe a fiduciary duty to act in a corporation's best
interest. Moreover, there is no basis for a belief that the interests of the
corporation and the individual shareholders will coincide. Thus, it is
absurd to subject individual shareholders to the whim of a shareholder
majority.
The opinion of the Court is disingenuous and it imparts an undeserved
ascription of wisdom to the Indiana Act.214 More significant is the court's
express recognition of the effectiveness of second generation state take-
over statutes.21 5 Such effectiveness wholly precludes the need for federal
offer voting control. Id. at 1648. But the Court's conclusion is devoid of analysis or
explanation. The Court failed to note that tender offer regulation is the only subject-area
subject both to federal and state regulation.
211 107 S. Ct. at 1645-46.
212 Id. at 1654. See also supra note 173.
213 Id. at 1646. See also id. at 1654 (White, J., dissenting).
214 Accord State Takeover Laws: Constitutional but Dumb, Wall St. J., May 4, 1987, at 22,
col. 4.
215 Ultimately CTS Corporation shareholders voted not to extend voting rights to the
control shares acquired by Dynamics Corporation of America. Business Briefs, Wall St. J.,
May 26, 1987, at 34, col. 1. Thus, the effectiveness of the Indiana Act is graphically
demonstrated by its deprivation of effective control to an owner of control shares.
Prior to CTS, Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (D. Cal. 1985),
"confirm[ed] the ability of state courts to deal with substantive issues of corporation law and
corporate governance, including issues of fairness in the corporation's treatment of its
shareholders." The court noted a parallel state proceeding which granted an injunction to a
target corporation on the basis of its likely success on the merits of a state issue on the
overall fairness of a tender offer. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op.
(Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 1985), affd, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Under the Williams Act the essential showing to obtain an injunction is virtually
impossible. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 982 (1982), is the only case to impart substantive content to the Williams Act.
Furthermore, Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985), effectively
overruled Mobil. Thus, target corporations have generally been relegated to prospective
relief. Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
But federal law other than the Williams Act has been sufficient to warrant injunctive
relief. In Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Edelman, No. C-87-274G (D. N.C. Jun. 5, 1987)(mem. op.
and order granting preliminary injunction), the use of inside information by a former
1987]
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antitakeover legislation as Indiana Control Share Acquisition Act clones
will doubtless be enacted. 216
executive of the target company who acted as a "catalyst and consultant" to a takeover
attempt was the basis for an injunction. Further, a takeover financing plan in violation of
Federal Reserve Board Regulations G and U warranted a preliminary injunction in Caesars
World, Inc. v. Sosnoff, No. CV 87-01622-WJR(Px)(D. Cal. Jun. 12, 1987)(Order Clarifying
and Modifying Order Preliminarily Enjoining Defendants).
216 Shareholders Need a Knight-Errant, Wall St. J., May 27, 1987, at 30, col. 3 ("the
Indiana approach to hostile takeovers is today a beacon for other states to follow.")(written
by the governor of Indiana). But, significantly, Delaware has not rushed to follow Indiana's
lead. Delaware Fails to Adopt Law on Takeovers, Wall St. J., Jun. 16, 1987, at 2, col. 2.
Barring the enactment of federal legislation which would re-open pre-emption issues, see
supra note 45, CTS may end the chronicled efforts of the Ohio Legislature in its attempts
to shield Ohio corporations from market disciplines. Ohio legislators have consistently acted
to aid management in fending off takeover threats. In 1981, the Ohio Legislature passed Am.
H.B. 455, 114th Gen. Assembly, 1981 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-593 (Baldwin)(inserting Oaio REV.
CODE ANN. § 1331.021 (Anderson 1985) into close corporation legislation at the last minute),
as an emergency measure to protect Marathon Oil Co. from a pending takeover bid by Mobil
Oil Co. Judges demolish takeover shield, The Plain Dealer, June 27, 1986, at 15-B, col. 1;
Lorincz, U.S. Steel Finds Gusher in Find By Ohio, NORTHERN OHIO Bus. J. 3 (Nov. 23, 1981).
In further reaction to the Marathon takeover bid, the Ohio Legislature enacted the Ohio
Control Share Acquisition Act. Am. Sub. H.B. 822, 114th Gen. Assembly, 1982 Ohio Legis.
Serv. 5-395 (Baldwin)(enacting Orno REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.831, .832 & 1707.042
(Anderson 1985)). In 1986 the Control Share Acquisition Act was invalidated. Fleet
Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 637 F. Supp. 742 (S. D. Ohio 1986), affd, 796 F.2d 135 (6th
Cir. 1986), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 1949 (1987).
The constitutional validity of the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act is not established
by CTS. But the issues addressed on remand fall within narrow parameters. The parties
each read CTS with different degrees of expansiveness. Fleet argues that the Ohio Act is
unconstitutional because the Act extends beyond defining voting rights and prohibits a
purchase or sale of control shares. Memorandum of Fleet Aerospace Corporation on the
Applicability of CTS v. Dynamics at 8-9. The State of Ohio suggests that in practical effect
the Ohio Act is identical to the Indiana Act upheld in CTS. Specifically, it is argued that the
Ohio Act's prohibition on purchases is a distinction of no constitutional significance because
"Ohio merely does directly what Indiana accomplishes indirectly." Brief in Support of the
Motion of the State Defendants-Appellants at 9.
Fleet's argument is better because the purchase and sale prohibitions in the Ohio Act
change the dimension of the shareholder vote. A purchase of "control shares" necessarily
removes a significant block of shares from the voting process. The presence or absence of
"control shares" in the shareholder vote bears the potential to alter unpredictably the
outcome of a shareholder vote. Thus, Ohio's pre-purchase voting scheme differs significantly
from Indiana's post-purchase voting provisions.
But CTS indicates that the constitutionality of the Ohio Act will not be judged by the
wisdom of its methods. Therefore, the State of Ohio's practical effect theory is constitution-
ally tenable. Regardless, the outcome of Fleet is of little significance. If the more restrictive
Ohio Act does not survive constitutional scrutiny the Ohio Legislature can assure the
existence of an effective control share acquisition act by swiftly adopting legislation
patterned after the Indiana Act.
Undeterred by the setback in Fleet, the Ohio Legislature again took specific, emergency
measures to adopt statutory amendments designed to forestall a pending takeover bid for
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although the current wave of takeover activity has created a great deal
of concern and has prompted repeated calls for federal antitakeover
legislation, prevailing conditions do not merit such a drastic departure
from the existing regulatory scheme. Takeover activity has traditionally
run in cycles, and as economic conditions change heightened activity will
doubtless decline. Furthermore, contested takeovers only represent a
small portion of aggregate takeover activity. In the few isolated instances
where disputes will occur adaptations of common law doctrines to current
trends will provide sufficient resolution.
Increased takeover activity is primarily the result of forces indepen-
dent of law. Existing common law has adequately intervened when
symptomatic problems have arisen; thus, federal antitakeover legislation
is not necessary.
Moreover, federal antitakeover legislation is not wise. Proposed legis-
lation is ill-conceived and improperly based. Shareholder protection is
predominately claimed as the thrust of legislative proposals, yet pre-
scribed shareholder voting procedures or regulatory restrictions would be
ineffectual and counterproductive to that end. Rather than affording
shareholder protection, proposed legislation would effectively afford
protection to management of target corporations. In the process share-
holders would be stripped of their best protection by the elimination of
market disciplines which serve to best protect their interests.
Congress is neither able fully to comprehend the implications of
takeovers nor to draft legislation capable of equitable application in all
circumstances. State legislatures have acted out of sheer protectionism
rather than careful study. Under such circumstances legislation would
undoubtedly increase uncertainty and exact additional costs to the
takeover process while positive results are unlikely.
the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. Privately drafted amendments, enacted as a
temporary measure, served to fend off the takeover. Am. Sub. H.B. 902, 116th Gen.
Assembly, 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-1096 (Baldwin); Legis-letter, 59 OHIo ST. B. Ass'N REP.
1998, 1999 (1986); Nimble Financier, supra note 41. Apparently pleased with its success, the
Ohio Legislature made the Goodyear antitakeover amendments permanent. S.B. 50, 116th
Gen. Assembly, 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-1 (Baldwin).
The heart of the Goodyear amendments is OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.16 (Anderson Supp.
1986), by which "Ohio ... became the first state to sanction by statute the poison pill'
defense." Case & Ellis, Significant New Corporate Legislation, 59 OHIO ST. B. ASS'N REP.
2000, 2004 (1986). Other provisions of Am. Sub. H.B. 902 affecting the duty of care are
discussed in supra note 88.
The brazen protectionism of the Ohio Legislature is doubtless less susceptible to
constitutional scrutiny, on pre-emption grounds, in the wake of CTS. But see supra note 45.
But if the Ohio Legislature is to be truely responsive to the long-term needs of Ohio it
must temper its quest to be at the forefront of corporate legislation with the realization that
beyond creating an atmosphere conducive to corporations, it should not create an atmo-
sphere abusive to shareholders. See Ohio Takeover Law Cause Stock - Price Fall, SEC Says,
Wall St. J., May 19, 1987, at 6, col. 4.
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Efficient, effective management provides the best form of shareholder
protection. Operative management cannot be legislatively mandated;
therefore, takeover restraints, however oblique, would not be wise.
JEFFREY A. JOHNSON
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